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Summary
Congress is considering President Bush’s requests for new funding and
additional authority to provide assistance to Colombia and six regional neighbors in
a continuation of the Andean Regional Initiative launched in 2001.  The Colombia
request, which included a request for authority to support military action against
illegal armed groups in Colombia, has proven highly controversial.  
On February 4, 2002, President Bush submitted a FY2003 budget request that
would provide $979.8 million for the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI), with $731
million in counternarcotics assistance under the Andean Counterdrug Initiative
(ACI).  This request included $537 million in ARI funding for Colombia, with $439
million in ACI funding and $98 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to train
and equip a Colombian army brigade to protect an oil pipeline in northeastern
Colombia. 
On March 21, 2002, the Administration proposed an Emergency FY2002
Supplemental for counter-terrorism purposes that included a request for $4 million
of State Department international narcotics control (INC) funding for Colombia
police post support, $6 million of FMF funding for Colombia and $3 million for
Ecuador for counter-terrorism equipment and training, and $25 million for counter-
kidnapping training in Colombia.  Also included in the submission were requests to
broaden the authorities of the Defense and State Departments to utilize FY2002 and
FY2003 assistance and unexpended Plan Colombia assistance to support the
Colombian government’s “unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, terrorist
activities, and other threats to its national security.” 
In legislative action in 2002, Congress passed the FY2002 Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act (H.R. 4775/P.L. 107-206), with expanded
authorities for activities in Colombia but with various human rights conditions, and
it  approved the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) extension and expansion  as
part of an omnibus trade bill (H.R. 3009/P.L. 107-210).  Later, it passed the Foreign
Relations Authorization for FY2003 (H.R. 1646/P.L. 107-228), and the FY2003
Intelligence Authorization Act (H.R. 4628/P.L. 107-306), with provisions relating to
Colombia.
In early 2003, passage of the FY2003 Foreign Operations Appropriation is still
pending.  The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version (S. 2779) in July
2002, cutting $94 million from the President’s Andean Counterdrug Initiative
request, and requiring several certifications and reports, while the House
Appropriations Committee approved its version (H.R. 5410) in September 2002 with
different requirements.  On January 15, 2003, Senator Stevens introduced an omnibus
FY2003 appropriations bill as S.Amdt. 1 to H.J.Res. 2 (for continuing
appropriations).  The bill includes a slightly modified version of the ARI-related
provisions of S. 2779, in particular providing $81 million less in ACI funding than
the President’s request.
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1 This report draws from CRS Report RL31016, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002
Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, by K. Larry Storrs and Nina M. Serafino, which
provides more background on the ARI and covers congressional action in 2001. 
2 “Plan Colombia” refers to the $1.3 billion in FY2000 emergency supplemental
appropriations approved by the 106th Congress in the FY2001 Military Construction
Appropriations bill (H.R. 4425, P.L. 106-246) for counternarcotics and related efforts in
Colombia and neighboring countries.  There was no limitation on the fiscal year in which
the funding could be obligated or spent; see Appendix C for a chart on the obligation of this
and other funding to Colombia in FY2000 and FY2001.  For more detail, see CRS Report
RL30541, Colombia: Plan Colombia Legislation and Assistance (FY2000-FY2001).  For
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Andean Regional Initiative (ARI):
FY2002 Supplemental and FY2003
Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors
In 2002 and early 2003, Congress has been considering President Bush’s request
for additional funding and additional authority to provide assistance to Colombia and
six regional neighbors in a continuation of the Andean Regional Initiative that was
launched in 2001.1  The region has been viewed as important primarily because it
produces virtually all of the world’s cocaine and increasing amounts of heroin.
Moreover, the stability of Colombia and the region is threatened by Colombia’s
longstanding guerrilla insurgency and rightist paramilitary groups, which are both
believed to be largely funded by “taxes” on illegal narcotics cultivation and trade. 
President Bush’s Andean Regional Initiative
Past Request for FY2002 Assistance
The Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) was launched in April 2001, when the
Bush Administration requested $882.29 million in FY2002 economic and
counternarcotics assistance, as well as an extension of trade preferences and other
measures, for Colombia and six regional neighbors (Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil,
Panama, and Venezuela).  Of this amount, $731 million was designated as
International Narcotics Control (INC) assistance in a line item in the budget request
known as the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI).  A central element of the
program has been the training and equipping of counternarcotics battalions in
Colombia.
According to the Administration, the distinctive features of the program,
compared to Plan Colombia assistance approved in 2000,2 are that a larger portion
CRS-2
2 (...continued)
the latest figures on aid to Colombia, as well as past assistance, see CRS Report RS21213,
Colombia: Summary and Tables on U.S. Assistance, FY1989-FY2003. 
3 See U.S. Department of State International Information Programs Washington File, Fact
Sheet: U.S. Policy Toward the Andean Region, and Transcript: State Department Briefing
on Andean Regional Initiative, May 17, 2001, also available at the following web site
[http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/colombia/].
4 See CRS Report RL31016, Andean Regional Initiative: FY2002 Assistance for Colombia
and Neighbors, for details on the aid conditions and levels of assistance. 
of the assistance is directed at economic and social programs, and that more than half
of the assistance is directed at regional countries experiencing the spill-over effects
of illicit drug and insurgency activities.  Another aspect of the initiative was
President Bush’s request for the extension and broadening of the Andean Trade
Preferences Act (ATPA) expiring in December 2001, that would give duty free or
reduced-rate treatment to the products of Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia. This
was a central topic when President Bush met with Andean leaders at the Summit of
the Americas meeting in Canada in April 2001.  
In a mid-May 2001 briefing on the Andean Regional Initiative, Administration
spokesmen set out three overarching goals for the region that could be called the
three D’s – democracy, development, and drugs.  The first goal was to promote
democracy and democratic institutions by supporting judicial reform, anti-corruption
measures, human rights improvement, and the peace process in Colombia.  The
second was to foster sustainable economic development and trade liberalization
through alternative economic development, environmental protection, and renewal
of the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA).  The third was to significantly reduce
the supply of illegal drugs to the United States from the source through eradication,
interdiction and other efforts.3  Under consideration by the Congress in 2001, critics
of the initiative argued that it overemphasized military and counter-drug assistance,
and provided inadequate support for human rights and the peace process in
Colombia.  Supporters argued that it continued needed assistance to Colombia, while
providing more support for regional neighbors and social and economic programs.
By the end of 2001, Congress approved, in the Foreign Operations
Appropriations Act (H.R. 2506/P.L. 107-115), $625 million for the ACI, $106
million less than the President’s ACI request.  Also included were a series of
conditions and certification requirements relating to human rights and to the
controversial aerial eradication spraying (also known as aerial fumigation) program
to destroy illicit coca crops, and an alteration of the cap on military and civilian
contractors serving in Colombia.  
As detailed in the February 2002 budget submissions, the Bush Administration
has  allocated $782.82 million in FY2002 assistance to the ARI, of which $645
million was for the ACI account, including $20 million transferred from the general
International Narcotics Control account.4  While the House passed H.R. 3009 in late
2001 to extend the Andean Trade Preference Act through 2006, action in the Senate
was not completed.
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5 These criteria are (1) that the Colombian Commander General is suspending soldiers and
officers credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights or to have aided
or abetted paramilitary groups; (2) that the Colombian armed forces are cooperating with
civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities in prosecuting and punishing in civilian courts
any members credibly alleged to be involved in such offenses; and (3) that the Colombian
armed forces are taking steps to sever links with paramilitary groups and to execute
outstanding orders for the capture of their members.
FY2002 Required Reports on Human Rights Conditions and
Eradication Spraying.  The FY2002 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L.
107-115) contains requirements for two  certifications on human rights performance
and one report on the proper usage and safety of the chemicals used in eradication
spraying, and on the implementation of alternative development programs.   The first
human rights certification was issued on April 30, 2002, the second on September 9,
2002. On September 4, 2002, the usage and safety certification was issued, along
with information on alternative development programs. 
Human Rights.  Until April 30, 2002, all assistance provided to the
Colombian armed forces under the FY2002 and prior foreign operations
appropriations acts was on hold, awaiting the Secretary of State’s certification to
Congress that the armed forces were meeting three human rights conditions, as
required by Section 567(a) of the FY2002 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act
(P.L. 107-115).5  On April 30, the Secretary of State made the certification.  In a May
1, 2002 press statement regarding the certification, the Department of State noted that
“Despite some real progress, both we and the Government of Colombia recognize
that the protection of human rights in Colombia needs improvement....[and] we are
committed to continue working with the Government of Colombia on concrete
measures it should take to make further progress in improving the human rights
performance of its Armed Forces, including ending military-paramilitary
collaboration.” This certification released 60% of FY2002 assistance for the
Colombian armed forces. 
Three human rights organizations argued, however, that the situation in
Colombia did not justify the certification.  Human Rights Watch, Amnesty
International, and the Washington Office on Latin America issued a joint statement
with three specific objections: (1) although some low-ranking Colombian military
officers have been suspended for human rights violations, the Colombian Armed
Forces “have refused to act on notorious cases such as that of General Rodrigo
Quiñones;” (2) that information claiming progress regarding military cooperation
with civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities was provided by the Colombian
Attorney General’s office “which has over the past several months fired human rights
prosecutors and put obstacles in the way of investigating high-ranking members of
the Armed Forces;” and (3) that the certification “provides no evidence of arrests or
actions against key paramilitary leaders or high-ranking members of the Armed
Forces credibly alleged to have collaborated with paramilitary groups.” (See
[http://hrw.org/press/2002/05/colombia0501.htm] for the statement, and go to
[http://hrw.org/press/2002/02/colombia0205.htm] for these groups lengthy analysis
of the situation in Colombia, issued on February 5, 2002.)
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A second certification that these human rights condition were being met was
required under Section 567 (a), as of July 1, 2002, in order to release the remaining
40% of the assistance for the armed forces.  On September 9, 2002, the Secretary
issued this certification.  The three human rights organizations who objected to the
first certification for FY2002 funds also objected to the second. In a September 11,
2002, document, they stated that “Colombia has again failed to meet a single one of
the statutory condit ions.”  (This  document  is  avai lable  at
[http://hrw.org/backgrounder/americas/colombia-certification4.htm].)
Human Rights Watch praised, however, the Bush Administration’s November
2002 decision to suspend military assistance to a Colombian Air Force unit which
reportedly, in the midst of a December 1998 battle with the FARC, had launched
r o c k e t s  t h a t  s t r u c k  c i v i l i a n  h o m e s .   ( S e e :
[http://hrw.org/press/2002/11/colombia112102.htm].)
 
Eradication Spray Chemicals Usage and Safety.  Under the section on
the State Department’s Andean Regional Initiative funding, P.L. 107-115 placed an
immediate hold on about $17 million in FY2002 funds for the purchase of chemicals
for the aerial spraying of coca plants until the Secretary of State reported to the
appropriations committees (1) that such fumigation is being carried out under EPA
regulatory controls applicable in the United States, (2) that the chemicals and their
manner of application do not pose unreasonable risks to or result in adverse effects
on people or the environment, (3) that the spray is in accordance with Colombian
law, and (4) that compensation procedures are in place for those seeking damages.
Meanwhile, U.S.-funded aerial eradication spraying continued in Colombia, albeit
reportedly at a reduced rate.  According to a State Department official, the spraying
was carried out with chemicals that were already in Colombia or that were purchased
with prior year funds. 
On September 4, 2002, the State Department issued a “Memorandum of
Justification Concerning Determination on Health, Environmental, and Legal Aspects
of Coca Eradication in Colombia.”  This document states that (1) the spraying is
being carried out in accordance with EPA regulatory laws as labeled for use in the
United States; (2) that it is being carried out in accordance with Colombian laws; (3)
that the chemicals used and the manner in which they are applied “do not pose
unreasonable risks or adverse effects to humans or the environment;” and (4) that
there are procedures in place to evaluate local citizens’ claims that eradication
spraying had damaged legal crops, and “to provide fair compensation for meritorious
claims” [http://www.state.gov/inl/rls/rpt/aeicc/13232.htm].
Nonetheless, an EPA assessment appended to the memorandum finds that the
spray mixture is potentially toxic enough to recommend that “an alternative
glyphosate product (with lower potential for acute toxicity) be used in future coca
and/or poppy aerial eradication programs.”  That assessment notes that there are “no
risks of concern” from glyphosate, the herbicide (and main ingredient) used in the
spray mixture.  However, the report indicates that the mixture used in the spraying
(“formulated mixture”), which contains other ingredients, can be problematic.  The
EPA assessment notes that the Department of State has not supplied EPA with data
from six acute toxicity tests on the spray mixture, without which EPA cannot
evaluate the toxicity effects.  EPA notes, however, that a component added to help
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6 Other funding, for Department of Defense activities in the Andean Region, is requested as
part of the DOD counternarcotics account, which funds DOD counternarcotics activities
worldwide.  A breakdown of intended allocations of that account does not become
(continued...)
the spray adhere to a plant (the “surfactant”) “reportedly can cause severe skin
irritation and be corrosive to the eyes....  The product has been determined to be
toxicity category I for eye irritation, causing irreversible eye damage.”  It also stated
that the potential for adverse effects on the eyes is “primarily” on those who mix and
load the spray.
Several critics of the spray program responded to the State Department’s report,
criticizing its conclusions.  Most importantly from a health and safety standpoint,
critics charge that the Department of State has not demonstrated that the spraying
program is being carried out in accordance with EPA regulatory controls “as labeled
for use in the United States,” and has not demonstrated that the program poses no
unreasonable risks or adverse effects to humans or the environment.  A collection of
critics’ statements can be found at Amazon Alliance’s web site,
[http://www.amazonalliance.org/scientific/scientific1.htm].
Progress of Alternative Development Implementation.  Also under the
section on Andean Regional Initiative funding, the Administration would lose
authority to use FY2002 funds to purchase aerial fumigation chemicals after July 10,
2002, unless and until alternative development programs had been put in place in the
areas where spraying was taking place.  The  September 4, 2002 Memorandum of
Justification also addressed this issue.  It stated that alternative development
programs were being carried out in 16 of the 17 departments where spraying has
taken or will take place in 2002.  In the one department where  a program is not being
carried out, an alternative development program agreement has been negotiated and
a work contract signed, and no further spraying will take place until the program is
implemented. 
Current Request for FY2003 Assistance
On February 4, 2002, President Bush submitted a FY2003 budget request for the
Andean region that would provide about $979.8 million for the Andean Regional
(ARI) Initiative, including $731 million in counternarcotics assistance under the
Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), with some ACI  funds being used for social
and economic programs.  The FY2003 request is similar to the FY2002 request,
except that the Administration is requesting $98 million in Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) for Colombia to train and equip a Colombian army brigade to
protect the Cano-Limon oil pipeline in northeastern Colombia.  The request marked
a sharp break with previous policy towards Colombia, as it was the first request for
military assistance provided specifically for a purpose other than counternarcotics
operations.  The Administration is also  requesting $1 million each for Bolivia,
Ecuador, Panama, and Peru in FY2003 FMF funding.
Requested FY2003 foreign operations funding of $979.8 million for ARI,
including $731 million for ACI, is to be distributed as follows in descending order:6
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6 (...continued)
publically available until after DOD funds are appropriated.  
7 For critical comments, see statements on the Center for International Policy’s Colombia
Project web site [http://www.ciponline.org/colombia] under CIP Analyses, under U.S.
Military and Police Aid (especially Other Groups’ Analyses) and under U.S. Government
Information (especially Legislators).  For supportive comments, see statements on the same
web site under U.S. Military and Police Aid (especially Other Groups’ Analyses), and U.S.
Government Information (especially statements from Officials and Legislators).
! Colombia: $537 million in ARI funding, including $439 million in
ACI funding and $98 million in FMF funding.
! Peru: $186.6 million in ARI funding, including $135 million in ACI
funding and $1 million in FMF funding.
! Bolivia: $132.6 million in ARI funding, including $91 million in
ACI funding and $1 million in FMF funding.
! Ecuador: $65.1 million in ARI funding, including $37 million in
ACI funding and $1 million in FMF funding.
! Brazil: $29.5 million in ARI funding, including 12 million in ACI
funding.
! Panama: $20.5 million in ARI funding, including $9 million in ACI
funding and $1 million in FMF funding.
! Venezuela: $8.5 million in ARI funding, including $8 million in ACI
funding
Proponents of the Administration’s request argue in the context of the post-
September 2001 war on terrorism that Colombia and the region should be supported,
and they have urged the Administration to seek expanded authority to provide
support for an expansion of  activities.7  On March 6, 2002, the House passed H.Res.
358 expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that “the President, without
undue delay, should transmit to Congress for its consideration proposed legislation,
consistent with United States law regarding the protection of human rights, to assist
the Government of Colombia protect its democracy from United States-designated
foreign terrorist organizations and the scourge of illicit narcotics.” 
  
Critics argue that the new request would expand the U.S. military role in
Colombia, now strictly limited to counternarcotics, into a problematic
counterinsurgency one.  Critics who emphasize human rights considerations argue
that such a role would inevitably involve tolerance of the linkages between the
Colombian military and paramilitary groups which are responsible for gross
violations of human rights.  (A particular concern is the lifting of human rights
conditions concerning paramilitary groups in the FY2002 supplemental request, see
below.) Others, who believe U.S. military power should not be committed unless it
can be effective, warn that the proposed assistance falls far short of that required to
have any significant effect on the situation in Colombia.  Many also worry that the
United States is slowly being drawn into a Vietnam-like morass, providing assistance
to a government that does not have the credibility and political will to pay for and
successfully wage its own war, and conclude a just peace.
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Request for Emergency FY2002 Supplemental Aid 
On March 21, 2002, the Bush Administration requested $27.1 billion in
Emergency FY2002 Supplemental Assistance, which was mostly to support
Department of Defense and Homeland Security counter-terrorism efforts, but would
also provide $38 million in additional funding and authorities relating to Colombia
and the Andean Region.  Included in this submission was a request for $4 million of
INC funding for Colombia police post support, $6 million of FMF funding for
Colombia for infrastructure security and $3 million for Ecuador for counter-terrorism
equipment and training, and $25 million of Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism and
Demining funding for a counter-kidnapping program for members of Colombia’s
police and armed forces.
The submission also included a request for up to $100 million in Department
of Defense funding for defense articles, services, and training to be used worldwide
“to support foreign nations in furtherance of the global war on terrorism, on such
terms and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine . . . “  and for $30
million to assist “indigenous” forces.  Although the request contained no indication
that the Administration intended to use any of these funds for Colombia or any other
ARI country, critics feared the precedent that would be set by granting such
assistance.  Such funds, they argued, could be used by the Department of Defense to
carry out  foreign security assistance programs free of the congressionally  mandated
controls on State Department programs.
The supplemental submission proposed to broaden the authorities of the
Defense and State Departments to utilize FY2002 and FY2003 assistance and
unexpended Plan Colombia assistance to support the Colombian government’s
“unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, terrorist activities, and other threats
to its national security.” According to the Administration’s explanation, these
provisions “would allow broader authority to provide assistance to Colombia to
counter the unified ‘cross-cutting’ threat posed by groups that use narcotics
trafficking to fund their terrorist and other activities that threaten the national security
of Colombia.”  
Such a change would allow the Administration to expand the scope of U.S.
assistance, particularly military assistance, to Colombia, allowing State and Defense
department funds to assist the Colombian government to counter any threat to its
national security.  The immediate, and widely discussed, effect of this change would
be to allow the U.S. government to broaden the circumstances under which it
currently shares intelligence with Colombian security forces, providing intelligence
not only for counterdrug operations, but also for military operations against the
Colombian guerrillas and paramilitaries.  The change would also permit the Plan
Colombia helicopters and other equipment that the United States has provided to be
used for such purposes.
As proposed by the Administration, the “Leahy Amendment” conditions in the
foreign operations and defense appropriations legislation forbidding assistance to
military and police units credibly alleged to engage in gross violations of human
rights would continue to apply, as would the current caps of 400 each on the number
of U.S. civilian contractors and U.S. military personnel supporting “Plan Colombia”
CRS-8
8 For information on ATPA see CRS Report RL30790, The Andean Trade Preference Act:
Background and Issues for Reauthorization, by J.F. Hornbeck.  For information on the U.S.-
Caribbean Trade Partnership Act and other regional free trade agreements, see CRS Issue
Brief IB95017, Trade and the Americas, by Raymond J. Ahearn. 
activities in Colombia. (The new proposed military activities, i.e., infrastructure
protection and anti-kidnapping assistance, are not, however, “Plan Colombia”
activities.) Except for those two specifically mentioned conditions, however, the
Administration’s proposal states that funding would be provided “notwithstanding
any provision of law.”  That statement would lift conditions like those of Section 567
of  P.L. 107-115, the FY2002 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, which has
stiffer provisions regarding human rights violations by security forces, and also
requires the armed forces to address the continuing links of some of its members with
illegal rightist paramilitary groups.  It would also lift P.L. 107-115 conditions
regarding aerial fumigation spraying and alternative development.  
For further discussion on U.S. policy towards Colombia, see the section on
Colombia, and for discussion on the progress of legislation, which was signed into
law on August 2, 2002 (H.R. 4775, P.L. 107-206), see the section on Major
Legislative Activity, both below.
Request for Extension of Andean Trade Preference Act
(ATPA)
Another aspect of the Andean Regional Initiative was President Bush’s request
in 2001 for the extension and broadening of the Andean Trade Preferences Act
(ATPA) that expired in December 2001, that would give duty free or reduced-rate
treatment to the products of Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia.  The countries are
looking for parity with Central American and Caribbean preferences, provided in the
U.S.-Caribbean Trade Partnership Act approved in 2000, in order to prevent a
diversion of trade and investment from the Andean region to Central America or the
Caribbean.8  The House passed H.R. 3009 in late 2001 to extend the ATPA through
2006, and the Senate passed the ATPA extension on May 23, 2002, as part of an
omnibus trade bill including trade promotion authority and trade adjustment
assistance.   Without congressional action the Act expired on December 4, 2001, but
on February 15, 2002, the Administration implemented a 90-day deferral of duties
to stay increased tariff burdens. When President Bush met with Andean leaders
during his trip to Peru on March 23, 2002, extension of the Andean Trade
Preferences Act was a major topic of discussion.  Following lengthy debate and
passage of the House-Senate conference report by both houses in July 2002, the
Trade Act of 2002 was signed into law (P.L. 107-210) on August 6, 2002.  Title
XXXI of the Act, entitled  the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act,
extends preferential tariff treatment through December 31, 2006, and broadens
coverage to include products previously excluded.
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Situation in Colombia and Neighboring Countries
The Andean Regional Initiative is designed to provide assistance to seven
countries in the broadly defined Andean region9, or what the Administration has
called the Andean Ridge: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and
Venezuela. The ARI built on the Clinton Administration’s 2000 “Plan Colombia”
legislation, which sought to address the  increasing cultivation of coca and heroin
crops in Colombia through the creation of a Colombian Army counternarcotics
brigade, and sharply increased assistance for eradication and alternative development
programs in the country’s two southern provinces of Putumayo and Caquetá, the
region where illegal coca production and a leftist guerrilla presence was expanding
most rapidly.  The ARI expanded assistance to help counter possible spill-over
effects in six nearby countries:  Peru and Bolivia, where past successes in reducing
cocaine production could be threatened by expected progress in eradicating crops in
Colombia; Ecuador, the most exposed neighbor because of its border with
Colombia’s Putumayo province; and Brazil, Venezuela and Panama, where the threat
is primarily confined to common border areas with Colombia. In early 2002, there
is increased concern among Colombia’s neighbors as the Colombian conflict
escalates following the breakdown of peace talks between the government and the
country’s largest leftist guerrilla group.10
The region is important to the United States not only because it includes the
three major drug producing countries (Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru) where virtually
all the world’s cocaine and 60% of the heroin seized in the United States are
produced, but also two major oil producing countries (Venezuela and Ecuador) which
supply significant quantities of oil to the United States and are members of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).  While the designated
countries have diverse trading relationships, the United States is the major trading
partner by far for all of them.  For the five traditional Andean countries (Colombia,
Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia) the Andes mountain range that runs through
South America poses geographical obstacles to intra-state and inter-state integration,
but the countries are linked together in the Andean Community economic integration
pact.  The ARI countries are some of the most heavily populated in Latin America,
including the first (Brazil), third (Colombia), fifth (Peru), sixth (Venezuela), and
eighth (Ecuador) most populous.  Although Colombia and Venezuela have largely
European-Indian mixed race (mestizo) populations, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador have
significant indigenous populations.
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Colombia
Colombia’s spacious and rugged territory, whose western half is transversed by
three parallel mountain ranges, provides ample isolated terrain for drug cultivation
and processing, and contributes to the government’s difficulty in exerting control
throughout the nation.  With a population of 40.3 million, Colombia is the third most
populous country in Latin America after Brazil and Mexico, with a largely mixed
race (mestizo) population.  It is known for a long tradition of democracy, but also for
continuing violence, including guerrilla insurgency dating back to the 1960s, and
persistent drug trafficking activity.  Negotiated settlements were achieved with some
of the guerrilla groups in the 1980s, but fell apart by 1990 when former guerrilla
leaders and members participating in political activities were assassinated.  Recent
administrations have had to deal with a complicated mix of  leftist guerrillas, rightist
paramilitary (or “self-defense”) forces, both associated with many groups of
independent drug traffickers. 
During the presidency of  Andres Pastrana (August 1998 - August 2002), U.S.
involvement in Colombia deepened.  Pastrana was elected largely on the basis of
pledges to bring peace to the country by negotiating with the guerrillas, strengthening
the Colombian military and counternarcotics forces, and seeking international
support for these efforts and other reforms to address the  country’s unusually serious
economic difficulties.11  Months Pastrana’s inauguration, his administration initiated
peace talks with the country’s largest (17,000 - 20,000) guerrilla group, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and subsequently participated in
more informal tripartite talks with representatives from the smaller 3,000 - 5,000
member National Liberation Army (ELN) and civil society groups. In 1999, Pastrana,
with U.S. assistance, developed a $7.5 billion plan called “Plan Colombia,” with $4
billion to come from Colombia and $3.5 billion from international donors, but
funding from Colombia and the international community fell far short of those goals.
To support “Plan Colombia,” the Clinton Administration developed and the
U.S. Congress approved a $1.3 billion package of assistance in 2000, also called Plan
Colombia assistance.  Some $860.2 million or 67% of this assistance was to support
programs in Colombia, with $416.9 million for helicopters, training, and other
assistance to three Colombian Army counternarcotics battalions.  Expenses for big
ticket items were weighted toward support for counternarcotics activities, although
there was funding for alternative development and governance programs (mostly to
support counternarcotics objectives) and human rights programs, and conditions to
encourage an improvement in the military’s human rights performance.12
Pastrana’s hopes that his “Plan Colombia” would support the government’s
efforts to bring peace were frustrated by a variety of factors.  Among those often cited
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are the government’s lack of a negotiating strategy, the poor implementation of
elements of Plan Colombia (by both the U.S. and Colombian governments), and a
lack of interest by the guerrillas in negotiating peace.  On February 20, 2002, the day
after the FARC and the government had exchanged cease-fire proposals, Pastrana
decided to terminate peace talks with that group, and ordered the military to retake
the “despeje,” i.e., the sanctuary conceded to the FARC in November 1998 as an
incentive to enter into negotiations.  Pastrana’s decision was prompted by the
FARC’s hijacking of an airliner and kidnapping of a Colombian senator on the plane,
the fifth national legislator to be taken in 8 months.  The decision was taken in the
midst of an intensification of guerrilla actions, including infrastructure sabotage.
Days later, FARC kidnapped, Ingrid Betancourt, another Colombia Senator who was
also a presidential candidate with a small following. 
The Uribe Administration: Security and Peace Plans.13  The perception
of a deteriorating security situation in Colombia’s major cities is often cited as the
deciding factor in the May 26, 2002 presidential election.  The winning candidate,
Alvaro Uribe, had promised more aggressive action to combat drug trafficking and
terrorism.  He won the election by a relative landslide, taking just over 53% of the
vote in an eleven-candidate field.  (He is the first president since the 1991
constitutional reform to win by an outright majority, thus avoiding the run-off
election between the top two vote getters mandated by the 1991 constitution.) In his
victory speech, Uribe indicated that he  would ask for international mediation to
promote a dialogue with illegal armed groups in Colombia, but that the government
would  only engage in negotiations with  those groups that would “give up terrorism
and agree to a cease-fire.”  With that statement, he seemed to indicate that he would
treat the paramilitary groups on a par with the guerrillas, departing to some extent
from the Pastrana administration’s refusal to negotiate with them.   Before his
inauguration, Uribe visited the United States and met with U.N. and U.S. officials,
and requested U.N. assistance in resolving the conflict in the country.  He also
appointed a largely moderate and technocratic cabinet with representation from
various parties. 
Uribe took office on August 7, amid a  still escalating conflict with the FARC.
In the days after his election, the FARC (now numbering some 16,000-17,000 and
operating in all but one of Colombia’s 32 departments), threatened with death all
mayors who did not resign their posts. (Although some mayors did resign, many
others decided to remain in their posts, and some moved to exercise their positions
from more secure areas.)  The FARC also opened a new offensive with armed
attacks, including relatively large confrontations with rightist paramilitary groups and
massacres of civilians in several geographic areas, and bombings in the urban areas
of Medellín and Cartegena.14  On inauguration day, the FARC launched a mortar
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attack in Bogotá, close to the Congress building where Uribe was being sworn in.
At least 19 people died in the attack.15  
Within days of the inauguration, Uribe or members of his administration
announced several measures to support a military build-up:  
! Uribe quickly promulgated  a decree invoking emergency powers,
which provides “authority to recruit quickly up to 6,000 soldiers for
two elite, mobile brigades, as well as 10,000 new police officers and
100,000 civilian informers,”16 and to restrict certain freedoms;17 
! He imposed a 1.2% war tax on approximately 400,000 upper income
individuals and businesses (with liquid assets over $60,000) to raise
the $800 million needed for an expanded military effort;18 
! He initiated the “Plan Meteor” unarmed “citizen police” informant
network; 
! His administration announced a plan to arm thousands of peasants
(news accounts cited some 15,000 or 20,000) to be the first line of
defense against guerrillas and paramilitaries in areas where there is
no military presence;19 and 
! He called for a referendum to restructure the Colombian Congress
by reducing the number of representatives, restricting its budgetary
powers, and allowing it to be dissolved by popular vote.  
In his inaugural speech, Uribe announced that he had asked U.N. Secretary
General Kofi Annan for his assistance in promoting a dialogue with the guerrillas
through U.N. “good offices” mediation.  Annan responded favorably to the request,
but FARC rejected the notion of U.N. mediation.  In a message to Uribe dated
August 20, 2002 and posted on the FARC website [http://www.farc-ep.org], the
FARC indicated its willingness to resume dialogue with the government on the
agenda established with the Pastrana administration, and with the active participation
of “social and popular organizations.”  It also asked for several guarantees, including
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the “demilitarization of the departments of Putumayo and Caquetá.” It also called for
a government commitment to “eradicate paramilitarism as the official policy of the
government,” punishing military, police, and other government personnel who have
been implicated in paramilitary activities, as well as those who finance and otherwise
promote them. 
Uribe has also indicated a willingness to try new methods of reducing violence.
In late August, he stated that he would support regional attempts to negotiate peace,
although such efforts would be monitored by the national government.  He said that
he had authorized the governor of the department of Bolivar, to enter into “‘informal
conversations’” with illegal group operating there.20  
In late December 2003, the Uribe government appointed a commission to
explore the possibility of a dialogue with the AUC.  This initiative grew out of an
October 2002 meeting of Colombia’s High Commissioner for Peace and five Roman
Catholic bishops with the AUC leadership, after which the AUC declared an
indefinite cessation of hostilities.  (The Bush Administration, which on September
25, 2002, had requested the extradition of two top AUC leaders, Carlos Castaño and
Salvador Mancuso, announced on January 8, 2003, that it would not withdraw the
request, even though such a dialogue might be imminent, according to a web report
of the Colombian daily newspaper, El Espectador.)
The Eradication Spraying and Alternative Development
Controversies.  In his inaugural speech, Uribe asserted that if Colombia does not
“drive out drugs, drugs will destroy our freedoms and our ecology, and the hope of
living in peace will be no more than an illusion.”  In that speech, he announced that
his administration would continue with Plan Colombia.  However, his administration
will seek to improve the program by “adding aerial interdiction and practical
substitution programs, such as payments to small-farmers for the eradication of
unlawful crops and care for the restoration of our woodlands.” 
The “Plan Colombia” eradication spraying program which began in December
2000 with operations by the U.S. funded counternarcotics brigade in Putumayo21 has
caused social and political turmoil in Colombia. (The Plan Colombia eradication
spraying program in the southern departments of Putumayo and Caquetá is not the
first such program in Colombia.  The United States has supported spraying efforts
elsewhere in the country for several years.)  Critics state that the spraying has
destroyed legal crops as well as illicit coca, and caused people and animals to suffer
ill health.  The related effort to support alternative development has been plagued by
delays, and the Colombian government has been slow to deliver much of the
promised $800 worth of farming inputs to the 38,000 families in 33 municipalities
who signed voluntary eradication pacts.  According to accounts in early 2002, less
than a third of those families have received any compensation and many were still
growing coca. Reports also have indicated that many Putumayo farmers did not
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intend to voluntarily eradicate coca before the July 2002 deadline22  This has led
many, including U.S. government officials, to conclude that the alternative program
is, at best, in great difficulty.  
In a February 2002 report, the U.S. General Accounting Office pointed out that
AID’s expansion of alternative development projects to coca-growing areas in 2001
faced “serious obstacles,” most importantly  inadequate security in coca-growing
areas, where the Colombia government lacks control, and the government has
“limited capacity to carry out sustained interdiction operations.”23  The GAO report
cast doubt on whether AID would be able to fulfill its goal of achieving dramatic
reductions of 11,500 hectares (almost 29,000 acres) in coca cultivation in 2002
through voluntary eradication of coca crops. Another difficulty was that the soil in
Putumayo had been found to be too poor to support the number currently farming in
that province if all were growing legal crops. As a result of these difficulties, the
State Department  decided to shift some funds from alternative development to
infrastructure projects that would provide jobs elsewhere.24  According to the H.Rept.
107-663, which accompanies the House FY2003 Foreign Operations Appropriations
bill (H.R. 5410), the strategy focuses on the “historic underdevelopment of the
[Putumayo] region” and concentrates on “local infrastructure needs (roads,
electricity, water) and delivery of services at the community level.”
Some analysts and policymakers have argued, however, that neither the
eradication nor the alternative development program should be abandoned, but that
they should be given the time and conditions necessary to work.  In its response to
the GAO, incorporated as an appendix to the GAO report, AID pointed out that
alternative development programs do not achieve drug crop reduction on their own,
and that the Colombia program was designed to support the aerial eradication
program and to build “the political support needed for aerial eradication efforts to
take place.”  It claimed that the 84,000 hectares (over 207,000 acres) of coca that
were sprayed in Colombia in 2001 represented a level unprecedented in new
eradication programs.  Despite this,  the State Department announced in March 2002
that coca cultivation in Colombia had increased 25% in 2001, although in December
2001 the Colombian government had estimated a 25% drop in cultivation that year.25
In a report to Congress on December 3, 2002 (required by the FY2002 Supplemental
Appropriation Act, P.L. 107-206), the State Department reported that 94,000 hectares
(about 234,200 acres) of coca had been sprayed in 2001, and that 140,000 hectares
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(345,800 acres) had been sprayed to that point in 2002.  It also reported voluntary
eradication of 9,000 hectares (about 22,200 acres) to that point in 2002.     
2002 U.S. Policy Debate.  During 2002, the U.S. policy focus on
counternarcotics programs became increasingly controversial for reasons beyond
implementation difficulties.  On the one hand, this focus was viewed by some
policymakers and analysts as insufficient to provide the support needed by a friendly
democracy under siege by powerful armed forces fueled by drug money. Proponents
of the Administration’s requests, in keeping with the sense of the House resolution
(H. Res. 358) mentioned above, argued in that in the context of the global war on
terrorism, Colombia and the region should be supported with counter-terrorism
assistance before the situation became even more dangerous, particularly when the
guerrillas had demonstrated little willingness to negotiate peace.26  They favored
expanding the scope of military assistance to strengthen the ability of Colombian
security forces to combat the leftist guerrillas and to expand their control throughout
rural areas, thereby undercutting the rationale and support for paramilitary groups.
Those who favored an expanded military approach did not necessarily favor
continuing the eradication and alternative development programs under current
circumstances, however.  Some argued that these programs, particularly the forced
aerial eradication, contribute to a counterproductive distrust of, if not hostility
toward, the Colombian government, alienating people whose support is needed for
counterinsurgency operations.  Some also argued that substantial assistance should
be provided to improve civilian government institutions and expand their presence
throughout Colombia.  
Some analysts and policymakers who wanted to expand military aid nonetheless
argued that further military assistance should not be provided until the armed forces
have adhered to current conditions on assistance requiring that they break ties to the
paramilitary groups and end human rights abuses.  They feared that paramilitary
groups, with their alleged ties to drug production and trafficking, may become
influential in Colombia’s national politics.  This, they argued, is itself a significant
threat to U.S. security interests.  In addition, some also believed that any expansion
of U.S. involvement should await a greater commitment by Colombia’s government
and elites to the war effort, including a larger budget for the Colombian military.  
Opponents of military aid attributed the problems of the counter-drug program
to what they view as its emphasis on a repressive and military approach to curbing
drug production. They would halt aerial fumigation spraying of coca crops and
counter-drug aid to the Colombian army, arguing that coca farmers cannot be
expected to abandon coca farming voluntarily until adequate economic alternatives
are in place.  They feared that forcing such farmers to give up coca growing will only
drive many to the ranks of the armed groups or to become displaced persons
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dependent on the state, perpetuating Colombia’s current economic difficulties and
violence.  Instead, many urged that current policy be replaced by one that focuses
largely on economic and social aid to combat the conflict’s root causes, curbs the still
rampant human rights abuses by paramilitary groups, provides vigorous support for
a negotiated end to the fighting in Colombia, and increasingly emphasize illicit drug
demand reduction in the United States. They also maintained that the emergency
supplemental proposal, in particular, with its request for authority to provide
assistance to help Colombia counter its many threats, would  involve the United
States in a major guerrilla conflict of indeterminate duration, i.e., in a
counterinsurgency campaign.27 
Funding and Requests for Colombia.
! Under the P.L. 106-246 Plan Colombia funding, Colombia received
$860.3 million.  Of that, $424.9 was State Department funding and
$91.8 was Department of Defense funding to assist Colombian
military anti-drug efforts through interdiction support and the
training and equipping of the Colombian counternarcotics battalions.
The remaining $435.4 was State Department funding for assistance
to the Colombian police, economic and alternative development
assistance, assistance for displaced persons, human rights,
administration of justice and other governance programs.
! Under  ARI allocations for FY2002, Colombia received $380.50
million (rather than the $399 million requested), with $243.50
million in counternarcotics assistance, and $137 million in economic
and social programs.  
! Under the Emergency FY2002 Supplemental request, Colombia
would receive $4 million of INC funding for police post support in
areas of weak government control, $6 million of FMF funding for
counter-terrorism equipment and training, and $25 million of
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism and Demining (NATD) funding
for counter-kidnapping training.
! Under the FY2003 request, Colombia would receive $537 million in
ARI funding, including $439 million in ACI funding, and $98
million in FMF funding to train and equip a Colombian army
brigade to protect an oil pipeline in the country
Peru
Peru, which shares its northern border with Colombia, is the fifth most populous
country in Latin America, with 27.5 million inhabitants (45% indigenous, 37%
mestizo, and 15% of European descent).  Peru’s new President,  Alejandro Toledo,
was inaugurated on July 28, 2001, following two-round presidential elections in
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April and June 2001.  His election and inauguration ended a period of political
uncertainty since the constitutionally questionable third term re-election in June 2000
of President Alberto Fujimori.  Although President Fujimori had considerable
support during his presidency (1990-2000) for restoring the economy, defeating the
guerrilla insurgency, and reducing drug trafficking activity, he was criticized for
corruption, human rights violations, and authoritarian tendencies.  He suddenly
resigned and fled into exile in November 2000, following allegations of corruption
associated particularly with security chief Vladimiro Montesinos.  Acting President
Valentin Paniagua governed during a transition period that included the well regarded
presidential elections.  
President Toledo, a longtime anti-Fujimori opposition leader, was elected on
June 3, 2001, with 53% of the vote, against former left-leaning Peruvian President
Alan Garcia with 47%.28  President Toledo has promised to end corruption and to
stabilize the economy, and many observers worry that the expectations of the
populace, especially poor, indigenous groups, are very difficult to achieve.  President
Toledo’s public support declined during the year, and opposition parties decisively
won the November 2002 elections for new regional governments.  The President  has
labeled drug trafficking a national security problem for Peru and has established a
drug czar for the country to better coordinate counternarcotics initiatives.  When
President Bush visited Peru on March 23, 2002, the two Presidents agreed to enhance
cooperation on counternarcotics and counter-terrorism issues.  
Representatives of Peru and the United States launched an investigation into the
circumstances and procedures leading to an incident on April 20, 2001, in which a
Peruvian military plane shot down a small plane, killing an American missionary
woman and her infant daughter, after a CIA surveillance plane had indicated that the
small craft might be involved in drug trafficking activities.  As a result of this
accident, U.S. surveillance of drug-related flights in Peru and Colombia was
suspended pending clarification of procedures.  The State Department released the
report of the U.S.-Peruvian investigative team on August 2, 2001, concluding that
“communications systems overload” and “cumbersome procedures” played a role in
the accident.  President Bush indicated during his March 2002 trip to Peru that talks
were continuing between the countries on appropriate procedures before the renewal
of the anti-drug surveillance flights. 
Peru is viewed as a success story in counternarcotics efforts because 6 years of
joint U.S.-Peru air and riverine interdiction operations, aggressive eradication efforts,
and alternative development programs have reduced coca production by 70%.
However, coca production remained constant in 2001 and there are reports of rising
prices for coca and increased growing of poppies.  Peruvian spokesmen have worried
about spillover effects of illicit drug activities from Colombia into Peru, and a
possible increase in coca production.  They have denounced illicit plantings of coca
and poppies in Peru, and international trafficking of arms through Peru to FARC
guerrillas in Colombia.  Responding to press reports that FARC forces have
penetrated into Peruvian territory, Peruvian officials stated in early 2002 that there
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are no permanent FARC forces in Peru, but they concede that they may cross
temporarily into border areas.  Because of these threats, Peru has moved military
bases from its border with traditional rival Ecuador, where tensions have diminished,
to the border with Colombia.  The March 20, 2002 bombing of a shopping center
near the U.S. Embassy in Lima, three days before President Bush’s visit to Peru,
raised fears of a resurgence of guerrilla groups.  At the conclusion of the presidential
visit, the two Presidents agreed to cooperate on counternarcotics and counter-
terrorism issues.  
Facing mounting protests, the Peruvian government temporarily suspended the
drug eradication program in the Upper Huallaga Valley in early July 2002, but
resumed the program in September 2002 once concerns were addressed.
Funding and Requests for Peru.
! As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia emergency supplemental
funding, Peru received $25 million for KMAX helicopters for the
Peruvian National Police, and benefitted from regional interdiction
funding .  
! Under ARI allocations for FY2002, Peru received $194.87 million
(rather than the $206.15 million requested), with $119.87 million in
economic and social programs, and $75 million in counternarcotics
aid.  
! Under the FY2003 ARI request, Peru would receive $186.6
million, including $119.6 million in economic and social programs,
and $67 million in counternarcotics and security assistance.  Peru is
not mentioned in the FY2002 supplemental request.
Bolivia
Landlocked Bolivia shares no border with Colombia, but Bolivia’s significant
gains in reducing illegal coca production could be threatened by any successes in
controlling production in Colombia.   Once the world’s foremost producer of coca
leaf, Bolivia made great strides in reducing coca cultivation under the Banzer-
Quiroga administration (1997-2002).29   However, forcible eradication of coca has
become a source of social discontent, exacerbating tensions over class and ethnicity
that may foment political instability in Latin America’s poorest country..     
With a population of 8.3 million (roughly 55% indigenous, and 45% mestizo
and European), Bolivia is the eleventh most populous country in Latin America., and
one of the continent’s most ethnically diverse and socially complex. It has also been
the Latin American country with the highest rate of changes of government, with few
governments lasting for their mandated terms.  Bolivia experienced a significant
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social revolution under the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) in the 1950s
with sweeping land reform, universal suffrage,  rural education, and nationalization
of the country’s important tin mines.  A period of military control ran from the mid-
1960s to the early 1980s.  Since the mid-1980s, Bolivia has experienced a period of
unprecedented political stability as a series of elected governments instituted
extraordinary political changes and economic liberalization, and peacefully
transferred power to their successors. Beginning in the mid-1990s, governments have
carried out major privatization programs and reforms that were heralded as putting
the country on a sound macroeconomic footing, but have also led to significant social
dislocations.   Economically, it is tied to the region through two organizations.
Bolivia is actively involved with the Andean Community.  It is also an associate
member of the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) formed by Brazil, Argentina,
Paraguay and Uruguay.
President Gonzalo Sanchez de Losada, a 72-year old wealthy businessman who
has served once before as president (1993-1997), began his 5-year term30 on August
6, 2002, under difficult circumstances.  As the candidate of the MNR in the June 30,
2002 popular elections, Sanchez de Lozada won only 22% of the vote in an eleven
candidate field.  Evo Morales, a 42-year old Aymara, who is head of the Movement
Towards Socialism (MAS) party and leader of the Bolivian coca growers union, ran
a close second.  Under the Bolivian constitution, the lack of a majority victory sent
the election to the Bolivian Congress, where Members of the upper and lower
chambers (27 senators and 130 representatives) selected between the two top vote
getters. To secure the presidency, the MNR formed a coalition with the Movement
of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), led by fourth place winner Jaime Paz Zamora,
Sanchez de Lozada’s traditional adversary and also a former president (1989-1993).
The inherent difficulties faced by Sanchez de Lozada in governing with far less
than a majority popular mandate are compounded by Morales’ increasing political
appeal and bellicosity.  Despite their leftist  names and origins, both the MNR and
the MIR are now usually considered “centrist” parties, led by members of Bolivia’s
traditional white elite.  Morales, on the other hand, was widely seen during the recent
electoral campaign as a rising voice for Bolivia’s indigenous inhabitants and as the
leader of the opposition bloc in Congress. That group, comprised largely of
indigenous politicians and trade unionists, reportedly hold between a quarter and a
third of the seats.  Head of the coca growers union for several years, Morales has long
opposed the forced eradication of coca crops in Bolivia.   His tactics have been
increasingly confrontational, and he was expelled from his seat in Congress in 2001
after accusations that he had incited coca growers to violence.  
Shortly after Sanchez de Lozada’s inauguration, his Interior Minister announced
the government would resume the eradication efforts of the previous government.
Perhaps foreshadowing challenges to come, both domestically and in relations with
the United States, confrontations erupted the next day between peasants and police
in the coca-growing Chapare and Yungas regions.  
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For some 20 years, U.S. relations with Bolivia have centered largely on
controlling the production of coca leaf and coca paste, which was usually shipped to
Colombia to be processed into cocaine.  In support of Bolivia’s counternarcotics
efforts, the United States has provided significant interdiction and alternative
development assistance, and it has forgiven all of Bolivia’s debt for development
assistance projects, and most of the debt for food assistance. Not until President
Hugo Banzer set a goal in his “Dignity Plan” of eliminating illegal coca cultivation
and narco-trafficking by the end of his 5 year term in 2002, was there much success.
Bolivia, like Peru, has been viewed by many as a counternarcotics success story, with
joint air and riverine interdiction operations, successful eradication efforts, and
effective alternative development programs reducing illegal coca cultivation to the
lowest level in 5 years, with a net reduction of approximately 70% between 1996 and
2001.  Others, however, view the forced eradication as a social and political disaster:
in places it was implemented regardless of the lack of availability of alternative
development programs funding, and in some places  the Dignity Plan’s mandated use
of the military to carry out the eradications has generated charges of human rights
abuses.31    
Since mid-2001, the program’s success in reducing coca production has suffered
reverses, according to the State Department’s International Narcotics Control
Strategy report (INCSR) for 2001. Although President Jorge Quiroga (the vice
president who assumed the presidency in August 2001 when President Banzer
resigned because of ill health) had promised to carry out the Dignity Plan program,
he relented after violent protests by coca growers in the Yungas and the Chapare
regions. The latter was once the country’s primary illegal coca-growing region. Much
of the illegal commercial crop had been eliminated there, but some has been
replanted.  The INCSR states that coca cultivation in Bolivia, which had dropped
steadily from 48,600 hectares (120,000 acres)  in 1995 to 14,600 hectares (36,000
acres) in 2000, had risen again to 19,900 hectares (49,000 acres) as of June 1, 2001.
 Sanchez de Lozada faces several crucial issues, related or in addition to the
coca  issue.  The first is the economy.  Critics, and even some who have supported
the program, claim that while eradication has been successful in dramatically
reducing coca cultivation, it has cost the overall  economy several hundred million
dollars annually.   This cost is considerable in a country where GDP growth in 2002
was predicted to tally only 1%, far less than the rate of population growth.  Another
critical task for the new president will be to decide how to proceed with a foreign
investment proposal to construct and operate a $5 - $6 billion Liquid Natural Gas
(LNG) export facility.  The intent has been to supply LNG to California from this
field by 2006.  In connection with the project, Bolivia would like to develop a
bilateral trade agreement with the United States.
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Funding and Requests for Bolivia.
! As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia emergency supplemental
funding, Bolivia received $25 million for regional interdiction
assistance and $85 million in alternative development assistance.  
! Under ARI allocations for FY2002, Bolivia received $122.96
million (rather than the $143.48 million requested), with $74.46
million in economic and social assistance, and $48.50 million in
counternarcotics aid.  
! Under the FY2003 ARI request, Bolivia would receive $132.6
million, including $82.6 million in economic and social programs,
and $50 million in counternarcotics and security programs.  Bolivia
is not mentioned in the FY2002 supplemental request.
Ecuador
On Colombia’s southern border, Ecuador is the most exposed of Colombia’s
neighbors because it is situated adjacent to southern Colombian areas that are
guerrilla strongholds and heavy drug producing areas With a population of 13.2
million, Ecuador is the eighth most populous country in Latin America.  While
roughly 65% of the population is mixed race mestizo, about a quarter is indigenous.
Ecuador is currently led by President Gustavo Noboa, the former Vice President who
took office in January 2000, after an uprising by elements of the military and
indigenous groups.  On January 15, 2003, he will be replaced by President-elect
Lucio Gutierrez, a retired colonel and a leader of the January 2000 uprising, who
was elected president in October and November 2002 elections on a populist, anti-
corruption campaign, although he has given assurances that he will follow sound
economic policies.  He will be inaugurated on January 15, 2003.
According to press reports, Colombian guerrillas pass into Ecuadoran territory
for rest, recuperation, and medical treatment, and there are reports that Colombians
are buying ranches and farms in the Ecuadoran border region, possibly for drug
cultivation.  Ecuadoran officials say they have uncovered and destroyed several small
cocaine processing labs in the area. The Ecuadoran border region is experiencing a
constant flow of Colombian refugees into the poor areas, and fighters with
Colombian paramilitary organizations have been arrested for running extortion rings
in Ecuadorian border regions.  The FARC has been accused of kidnapping people in
Ecuador, although the FARC denies the allegations.32  Ecuador reinforced its
northern border with Colombia in early 2002 as Colombian anti-guerrilla operations
intensified following the breakdown of the peace talks, and Ecuador was said to be
seeking additional international assistance.33
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Funding and Requests for Ecuador.
! As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia emergency supplemental
funding Ecuador received $20 million in U.S. assistance, of which
$12 million was to support drug interdiction efforts, and $8 million
was for alternative development  assistance.  Another $61.3 million
has been allocated for the construction of a Forward Operating
Location in Manta, Ecuador for counternarcotics aerial surveillance.
! Under ARI allocations for FY2002, Ecuador received $46.86 million
(rather than the $76.48 million requested), with $31.85 million in
economic and social programs, and $15 million in counternarcotics
aid. 
! Under the Emergency FY2002 Supplemental request, Ecuador
would receive $3 million of FMF funding for counter-terrorism
equipment and training.
! Under the FY2003 ARI request, Ecuador would receive $65.1
million, including $43.1 million in economic and social programs,
and $22 million in counternarcotics and security assistance.  Under
the Emergency FY2002 Supplemental request, Ecuador would
receive an unspecified amount of FMF funding for counter-terrorism
equipment and training.
Brazil 
Brazil’s isolated Amazon region, populated largely by indigenous groups, forms
Colombia’s southeastern border. With a population of 174.5 million,  Brazil is the
largest and most populous country in Latin America, with most of its inhabitants
concentrated in the more developed southeastern areas of the country and along the
Atlantic coast.  Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of the leftist Workers Party was inaugurated
as President on January 1, 2003, after decisively winning the second round
presidential election in October 2002, with support from a wide range of parties.  He
has promised to follow sound economic policies, while putting priority on the
elimination of hunger in the country.  Previously the country was governed by two-
term President Fernando Henrique Cardoso who ended years of inflation with his
Real Plan and weathered several financial crises with IMF assistance in 1998, 1999,
and 2002.  Brazilians have long been concerned about the sparsely populated territory
in the huge Amazon region, and they have been fearful historically of foreign designs
and intervention in this territory.
Brazil is not an illicit drug producing country, but it is a growing transit area for
cocaine moving from the Andean Ridge to Colombia.  In an effort to exercise control
over this vast territory Brazil has constructed a $1.4 billion sensor and radar project
called the Amazon Vigilance System, or SIVAM from its acronym in Portuguese,
and it has offered to share data from this system with neighbors and the United
States.  It has established a military base at Tabatinga, with 25,000 soldiers and
policemen, with air force and navy support, and has launched Operation Cobra with
heightened vigilance to deal with spillover effects from Colombia.  Press accounts
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suggest evidence of Colombian drug traffickers encouraging indigenous communities
in Brazil to plant coca, Brazilian drug traffickers linked to Colombian traffickers, and
FARC incursions along the border.  In one example in late 1998, the FARC captured
a city on the Colombian border, forcing Colombian troops to withdraw into Brazilian
territory, before recapturing the city.  In another example, a plane from Suriname
with arms for FARC guerrillas was discovered when it was forced to make an
emergency landing in Brazil.  In another more recent example, FARC forces crossed
into Brazil in early March 2002 and exchanged gunfire with Brazilian military
forces.34
Funding and Requests for Brazil.
! Brazil received only a small amount of Plan Colombia assistance,
but under  ARI allocations for FY2002 Brazil would receive $18.63
million (rather than the $26.18 million requested), including $6
million for counternarcotics and security, and $12.63 million for
economic and social development.
! Under the FY2003 ARI request, Brazil would receive $29.5 million,
including $12 million for counternarcotics and security, and $17.5
million for economic and social programs.  Brazil is not mentioned
in the FY02 supplemental request.
Venezuela
Venezuela, Colombia’s eastern neighbor, is the United States’ fourth largest
supplier of crude oil.  With a population of 23.9 million (of largely mestizo stock),
Venezuela is the sixth most populous country in Latin America.  The country is
presently led by President Hugo Chavez, a former disgruntled military leader and a
populist, who was initially elected in late 1998 on a campaign to rewrite the
constitution, rid the country of corruption, and more adequately meet the needs of the
people.  During 1999, at Chavez’s  request, Venezuelan voters approved the creation
of a National Constituent Assembly, elected members of the new assembly, and
approved the newly written constitution which lengthened the presidential term and
expanded presidential powers.  On July 30, 2000, in a so-called mega-election,
President Chavez easily won election to a new 6 year term of office.35  Because of his
previous attacks on the legislature and other institutions, many observers fear that he
has authoritarian tendencies somewhat like those of former President Fujimori in
Peru. 
Chavez has established close ties with Fidel Castro and other leftist leaders, and
he often employs anti-U.S. rhetoric.  He has denounced Plan Colombia as a U.S.-
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dominated military strategy, he has denied the United States overflight rights over
Venezuela territory, and there have been reports that he has friendly relations with
Colombian guerrillas.  Following the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United
States, Chavez criticized U.S. military action in Afghanistan, saying that the United
States was “fighting terror with terror,” and he  visited Libya, Iran, and Iraq,
prompting President Bush to exclude him from his March 2002 meeting with Andean
leaders in Peru.36  In recent months Chavez’s popular support has fallen and there
have been street demonstrations against him, calls for his resignation by retired and
active duty military officials, and disputes with the national oil monopoly over his
appointments.  In late March 2002, a Colombian military official claimed that the
FARC guerrillas had a camp in Venezuelan territory from which they launched an
attack, but Venezuela has rejected this claim and demanded clarification.37  
After massive opposition protests and military pressure, President Chavez was
removed from office on April 12, 2002, and business leader Pedro Carmona was
designated as head of an interim government, but Chavez returned to power on April
14, 2002 following street protests and dissatisfaction with Carmona’s hardline anti-
democratic measures.  United States representatives were criticized for appearing to
recognize the Carmona government and for having had contacts with opposition
groups, but they did support a vote in the Organization of American States calling for
the restoration of Chavez to power.  
Since early December 2002, President Chavez has been confronting a massive
general strike, including a work stoppage by workers and executives at the state oil
monopoly.  Opposition forces have been demanding a referendum or a new election
to measure Chavez’ support, but Chavez and his supporters claim that such measures
are contrary to Venezuela’s constitution.  OAS Secretary General Cesar Gaviria has
been seeking to mediate the conflict between the two sides.     
Venezuela is a major transit route for cocaine and heroin from neighboring
Colombia to the United States and Europe.  In 2001, some coca fields were located
and eradicated, and processing labs were detected and destroyed.  Despite various
policy disagreements with the United States, the Chavez government has cooperated
with the United States in counternarcotics efforts.  
Funding and Requests for Venezuela.
! While Venezuela received only a small amount of Plan Colombia
assistance, under the final ARI allocations for FY2002, Venezuela
would receive $5.5 million (rather than the $10.5 requested),
including $5 million in counternarcotics and security aid, and the
remainder in economic and social development programs.
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! For Venezuela, $8.5 million was requested in ARI funding, all but
$500,000 of which is ACI funds. Venezuela is not mentioned in the
FY02 supplemental request. 
Panama
Panama is separated from Colombia along its southern border by the difficult
and environmentally sensitive wetlands and rain forest of the “Darien Gap.”  Here,
the 16,000 mile Pan American highway (stretching from Alaska to the tip of southern
Chile) is interrupted for a 60 mile stretch.  A part of Colombia until 1903, Panama
is now the twentieth most populous country in Latin America, with a population of
2.8 million (of largely mestizo and West Indian origins).
 
Panama’s history has been heavily influenced by its strategic location and the
transit of commerce through the Panama Canal in the center of the country, where the
major cities are located.  It is led by President Mireya Moscoso, elected and
inaugurated in 1999, who has been dealing with economic difficulties in Panama, and
with Panama’s new responsibilities for the Panama Canal since the U.S. withdrawal
on the last day of 1999.  Despite considerable effort in the period leading up to the
U.S. withdrawal, Panama was unwilling to allow the United States to retain a formal
military presence in Panama for counternarcotics surveillance purposes.38  This
forced the United States to develop the Forward Operating Locations in El Salvador,
Aruba/Curacao and Ecuador as substitute locations for such activities.  Panama has
been the scene of cross-border incursions by Colombian guerrillas and by Colombian
paramilitary groups.  There is some evidence that paramilitary groups are being
founded in Panama, with support from Colombian groups, because of the perception
that the Panamanian government has left some areas unprotected.  Shipments of
small arms for the Colombian guerrillas have been seized in Panamanian territory as
well.
Panama is not an illicit drug producing country, but it is a major transshipment
point for illicit drugs, especially cocaine, smuggled from South America, and it is a
major site for money-laundering activity.  In recent years Panama has cooperated
with the United States in bilateral counternarcotics efforts, seizing significant
amounts of illicit drugs and enforcing recently passed anti-money laundering
legislation. In early 2002, a comprehensive U.S.-Panama maritime anti-drug
agreement entered into force. 
Funding and Requests for Panama.
 ! While Panama received only a small amount of Plan Colombia
assistance, under  allocations for FY2002, Panama is to receive
$13.50 million (rather than the $20.5 million requested), including
$8.5 million in economic and social development funding, and $5
million for counternarcotics and security programs. 
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Major Legislative Activity in 2002  
on Andean Regional Initiative Issues
FY2002 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations
The House approved the conference report on H.R. 4775 (H.Rept. 107-593) on
July 23, and the Senate approved it on July 24, 2002.  The President signed the bill
into law (P.L. 107-206) on August 2, 2002. 
House Action.  On May 9, 2002, the Appropriations Committee began to
mark up the FY2002 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act,  granting the
President some of the requested authorities relating to Colombia but denying some
of the other authorities.  On May 15, the committee forwarded the bill to the House
(H.R. 4775, H.Rept. 107-480), where it was passed, amended, on May 24.
Provisions regarding Colombia remained as in the Committee-reported bill. On May
23, 2002, the House rejected, 192-225, an amendment offered by Representatives
McGovern and Skelton that would have deleted the Committee language authorizing
expanded U.S. military activities in Colombia.
Committee Action.  As passed by the House Appropriations Committee, H.R.
4775 retains the full $38 million ($35 million for Colombia and $3 million for
Ecuador) requested for the ARI countries, but modifies assistance for Colombia and
the conditions on that assistance. The bill apparently leaves the $25 million for anti-
kidnapping funds under Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, and Demining (NATD)
Funding (as the President’s request is fully funded with no changes suggested), but
shifts $6 million for infrastructure security from the FMF account to the INC account,
where $4 million is also provided for assistance to police posts.  
As the President requested, the bill provides authority to expand the use of
FY2002 and previous year funding from the Department of State (Section 601) and
Department of Defense (Section 307) for Colombia well beyond counternarcotics
operations, although the authorizing language is slightly different from the
President’s proposed use of funds against “all threats” to Colombia’s national
security.  (The language of Sections 601 and 307 is identical.)  Instead, the
Committee provided that funds would be available “to support a unified campaign
against narcotics trafficking, against activities by organizations designated as terrorist
organizations...and to take actions to protect human health and welfare in emergency
situations, including undertaking rescue operations.”  The specified terrorist groups
are the two leftist guerrilla groups, the FARC and the ELN, and the rightist
paramilitary forces of the AUC.  
The Committee did not include  the President’s language requesting permission
to use the funds “notwithstanding any other provision of law,” except the Leahy
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Amendment and the personnel caps on Plan Colombia activities.  It did, however,
specify that the new authorities are “in addition to authorities currently available to
provide assistance to Colombia.” Under this provision, all current conditions on aid
to Colombia for previously appropriated funds would continue to apply.  The
conditions would not apply, however, to the funding provided under this bill.  
 The Committee added a requirement for an “Andean Security Strategy” report
within 30 days of the bill’s enactment.  The report would outline U.S. “policy and
strategy to assist Colombia as well as to achieve a robust security environment in the
Andean region.”  Six specific points are to be addressed: (1) the United States’ key
objectives in providing aid to Colombia; (2) a timetable and cost estimate for
achieving those objectives; (3) the U.S. role in assisting Colombian efforts to provide
security within the country; (4) how U.S. strategy in Colombia relates to a region-
wide Andean strategy; (5) a strategy, timetable, and cost estimates for assisting
Colombia’s efforts “to contain and eliminate the threat which the United Self-
Defense Forces (AUC)” poses to Colombia’s national security; and, (6) strategies to
help Colombia reach a negotiated political solution to its conflicts and to help it
design and implement a comprehensive strategy to deal with “the underlying socio-
political sources of the insurgencies and paramilitary counter-insurgency.”
The Committee report (H.Rept. 107-480) makes other references to  Colombia.
In the report, the Committee recommended that, in view of “the troubling situation
facing many internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Colombia” up to $10 million be
made available from INL or other funds to meet emergency IDP needs.  Regarding
new authorities, the Committee report noted that although the new authorities are
intended to be used against terrorist organizations identified through the State
Department’s processes, “the Committee recognizes that in certain emergency
situation[s], such as kidnappings, the use of United States assets may be required
before the affiliation of the perpetrators has been determined.”  The Committee stated
that it expects the authority to continue through FY2003 “unless the new government
of Colombia fails to commit itself to the counterdrug and security policies of the
Pastrana administration.  It also noted “that these authorities will continue to be in
effect in the event a continuing resolution is necessary for a portion of 2003.”  
The Committee refused the President’s request that the Secretary of Defense be
given discretion to decide on the uses of two new pots of money in the bill totaling
$130 million requested to assist foreign nations and indigenous forces with defense
articles, services, and training.  (Although Colombia was not specified as a potential
recipient of these funds, they could conceivably have been used there.) “The primary
responsibility of the Secretary of State for foreign assistance, and in particular
military assistance, is well established,” according to the report.  “Existing provisions
of law ... already provide sufficient authority for the purposes identified in the
President’s request.”  
The House did include in two DOD funding accounts, however, counter-
terrorism monies which could be used for Colombia, although Colombia is not
specifically mentioned in regards to either.  In language relating to the Department
of Defense’s Defense-wide Operations and Maintenance account, $420 million is
earmarked for payments to cooperating nations for military support provided to the
United States military in connection with the war on terrorism.  (The language
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specifically mentions Pakistan, Jordan, and the Philippines as recipients.)  Section
312  provides that $100 million from the DOD’s Defense Emergency Reserve Fund
“may be made available to reimburse foreign nations for the costs of goods, services,
or use of facilities provided in direct support of the operations by U.S. military forces
in the global war against terrorism...” upon written notification to and approval of the
appropriations committees.
Floor Action.  On May 23, 2002, the House considered the McGovern/Skelton
amendment that would have stricken the additional authorities in the bill that permit
U.S. assistance to go beyond strictly counter-narcotics purposes and to engage in
counter-guerrilla and counter-terrorism activities as well.  Proponents argued that the
new authorities would unnecessarily involve the United States in the internal affairs
of Colombia with an uncertain outcome, while proponents argued that broader
authority was necessary to provide the Colombian government with needed counter-
narcotics, counter-insurgency, and counter-terrorism assistance.  The amendment was
rejected by a vote of 192-225.
Senate Action.  On May 22, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported
its version of the supplemental appropriations bill, S. 2551, without a report, and then
filed the report, S.Rept. 107-156, on May 29, 2002.  On June 7, 2002, the Senate
approved H.R. 4775, after incorporating the text of S. 2551 into the House measure,
thereby retaining the provisions reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee.
During floor action, Senators Graham and DeWine introduced but later withdrew an
amendment (S.Amdt. 3569) to permit the use of Department of Defense funds for
counter-terrorism purposes.  
Committee Action.  The Senate Appropriations Committee substantially
altered the President’s request on Colombia.  In the State Department portions of the
supplemental bill, funding is specifically provided for Colombia in the INC and FMF
accounts.  Colombia is also mentioned in the Committee report (S.Rept. 107-156)
under the Migration and Refugee Assistance account as one of the countries suffering
a refugee crisis that threatens humanitarian and national security interests. Although
the Administration had not requested refugee assistance, the Committee added $50
million to the bill for that purpose.  (The House added $10 million but did not
mention Colombia.)  No mention is made in the bill of the $25 million in anti-
kidnapping funding requested for Colombia in the NATD account language, although
the amount appropriated by the committee bill for that account could conceivably
fully or nearly fully fund the Administration request. (The Committee added $10
million to the President’s request but also suggested changes in allocations.)  The
report notes that “Bolivia has made great strides in reducing coca cultivation” and
that the Bolivian government has requested human rights training, and counter-
terrorism training and assistance, for its police forces.  “The Committee urges the
State Department to seriously review these requests.”
The Senate Appropriations Committee bill would broaden authority for U.S.
military activities in Colombia, but not to the same extent as requested by the
President or as passed by the House.  Under Section 603(a), the Committee
authorized the use of counterdrug funds (i.e., those appropriated by this bill for
Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) assistance, FY2002 ACI funds appropriated in
P.L. 107-115, and unexpired balances from previous year funds from foreign
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operations acts) “to support the Colombian Government’s unified campaign against
narcotics trafficking and against paramilitary and guerrilla organizations designated
as terrorist organizations in that country.”  There is no similar authority in the bill for
funds provided for other than counternarcotics purposes.  According to the report,
“the Committee has broadened current authority to permit the use of U.S. equipment,
and U.S.-trained counternarcotics battalions” to support the unified campaign.  
The bill includes all human rights conditions contained in P.L. 107-115 and the
existing personnel caps on U.S. military personnel and civilian contractors and adds
new conditions under Section 603(b).  Section 603(c) specifies the provisions of
previous laws that remain applicable:  Sections 556, 567, and 568 of P.L. 107-115;
Section 8093 of the DOD FY2002 appropriations act; and Section 3204(b)(1), as
amended, of P.L. 106-246.  These provisions apply to funds appropriated under
Section 603(a) as well as funds made available elsewhere in the act for assistance to
the Colombian Armed forces and the Colombian National Police.  
As summarized by report (S.Rept. 107-156), the new Section 603(b)(1)
conditions “include a commitment by the newly inaugurated President of Colombia
to implement significant budgetary and personnel reforms of the Colombian Armed
Forces, and to expend substantial additional Colombian financial and other resources
to restore government authority and respect for human rights in areas under the
effective control of paramilitary and guerrilla organizations.  The Committee intends
that the reforms and additional resources will result in a better educated, higher paid,
professionally trained military which respects human rights.”  Section 603(b)(2)
provides that no U.S. military personnel or civilian contractors employed by the
United States “will participate in any combat operation in connection with assistance
made available under this Act or any other Act.”
The bill also requires a detailed report from the President on his policy
objectives,  the operations necessary and the cost to the United States, Colombia, and
any other participating country to achieve those objectives, and on benchmarks to
measure progress towards those objectives. The President’s report is also to include
information on and a time frame regarding the expected reduction in the amount of
cocaine and heroin entering the United States as a result of the ACI, and a statement
on the mission and objectives of U.S. military personnel and civilian contractors
employed by the United States in connection with ACI assistance, and threats to their
safety in Colombia.
In the State Department portions of the bill, the FMF language provides
authority for funds to establish, train, and equip a Colombian Army brigade dedicated
to providing security to civilian prosecutors in operations to collect evidence and
execute arrest warrants against leaders of paramilitary organizations.  No amount is
specified for that purpose.  The language also provides authority for assistance to the
Colombian armed forces to protect the Cano Limon oil pipeline, but with a cap of
$3.5 million (instead of the requested $6 million), and two conditions.  Obligation
of the pipeline protection funding is contingent upon a report from the Secretary of
State to the Appropriations Committee that an appropriate amount from the
Colombian government’s oil revenues from that pipeline will be spent on primary
health care, basic education, microenterprise, and  similar activities and programs to
improve the lives of the people of Arauca department.  It is also contingent on written
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promises from the private sector partners using the pipeline, Occidental Petroleum
and Repsol, that they will refund a portion of the funds based on their respective
shares in pipeline.  (The refunds would be placed in the Andean Counterdrug
Initiative account for use without any further appropriation by Congress.)
The INC account language, also in the State Department portions of the bill,
specifies that $2.5 million is appropriated for the Colombian National Park Service
for training and equipment for park rangers.  S.Rept. 107-156 notes that the State
Department proposes using $4 million from this account to “extend the presence of
Colombia’s police forces to rural areas previously under guerrilla or paramilitary
control.”  It states that the Committee “has also provided not less than $2,500,000 for
training and equipment for law enforcement officers to protect Colombia’s biological
reserves and national parks, which are increasingly vulnerable to coca growers and
illegal loggers.”
Like the House, the Senate Appropriations Committee did not include authority
or funding for the Secretary of Defense to use $130 million to assist foreign nations
and indigenous forces with defense articles, services, and training.  It also did not
specifically provide funding for reimbursing foreign nations for counter-terrorism
assistance, which the House did.  However, in language similar to that of the House,
the Committee also earmarked $420 million in the Department of Defense’s Defense-
wide Operations and Maintenance account for payments to cooperating nations for
military support provided to the United States military in connection with the war on
terrorism.  Colombia was not specifically mentioned, however.
Floor Action.  The Senate considered the Supplemental FY2002
Appropriations bill (H.R. 4775) providing counter-terrorism assistance on June 3-7,
2002, after incorporating the Senate measure (S. 2551) into the House bill.  The
Senate approved H.R. 4775 on June 7, 2002, retaining the Committee-reported
provisions relating to the Andean region, which provided less authority and more
restrictions than the House approved measure.  During the floor debate, Senators
Graham and DeWine introduced amendment (S.Amdt. 3569) to give the President
greater latitude to use Department of Defense funds for counter-terrorism purposes,
but then withdrew the amendment to facilitate passage of the broader package on
grounds that the issue would be resolved in conference.   
Conference Action and Enactment.  In the conference version of the bill
(H.Rept. 107-593), the conference committee appears to have fully funded the $38
million for Colombia  requested by the President, and granted broader authority to
pursue new activities in Colombia, but with modifications that blend House and
Senate provisions.  The House approved the conference report on July 23, and the
Senate approved it on July 24, 2002.  The President signed the bill into law (P.L.
107-206) on August 2, 2002.   
Anti-Kidnapping and Police Post Funding.  Neither the bill nor the
managers’ statement specifically mentions the $25 million requested in Non-
Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, and Demining Funds for an anti-kidnapping program
in Colombia, but that account was funded at $5 million more than the $83 million
requested by the President, providing funds to cover that program.  Neither the bill
nor the statement specifically mentions the $4 million requested in International
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Narcotics Control (INC) funds for the Colombia police post program for Colombia,
although that account appears fully funded.   INC funds will remain available through
FY2003. 
Pipeline Funding.  The bill did specifically mention funding of the $6 million
requested for protection of Colombia’s Cano-Limon oil pipeline, but changed the
source of funding from the FMF to the INC account.   The Secretary of State must
submit a report describing oil revenues earned by the government of Colombia from
the operation of the pipeline for the past year, the amount expended by the
government and by private oil companies using the pipeline to improve the lives of
the inhabitants of Arauca, the province in which the pipeline is located, the steps
being taken to increase and expand such programs, and the mechanisms being
established to monitor such funds. This report will be considered in connection with
the FY2003 budget, in which the President requested further funding for pipeline
protection.
Other Funding.  The bill also states that INC funds “should be made available
to train and equip a Colombian Armed Forces unit dedicated to apprehending the
leaders of paramilitary organizations.”  No amount is specified.
The managers’ statement notes that the situation of Internally Displaced Persons
(IDPs) in Colombia is “troubling.”  The managers direct that up to $10 million of
INC funds or of Migration and Refugee funds should be available to the State
Department for the emergency needs of IDPs, although they do not specifically state
IDPs of Colombia.
The managers note that the bill does not contain $2.5 million for the protection
of Colombian National Parks, whose environment is harmed by illegal drug
cultivation.  They state their intention to provide such funds in the FY2003 ACI
account.
There is no specific mention of the requested $3 million in Foreign Military
Financing for Ecuador.
Expanded Authorities.  The bill provides identical authority for the use of
INC and Department of Defense (DOD) funds, including prior year funds, to support
“a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, against activities by organizations
designated as terrorist organizations” such as the FARC, ELN and AUC, “and to take
actions to protect human health and welfare in emergency circumstances, including
undertaking rescue operations.”  (Section 601 contains the authority for INC, Section
305 for DOD).  The use of these funds is subject to the full range of human rights
conditions on prior year funding in P.L. 107-115 and P.L. 107-117), to the
restrictions on visas in P.L. 105-115, and to current caps of 400 on the number of
U.S. civilian contractors, and on the number of U.S. military personnel (with certain
exceptions) in Colombia.   The managers recognize in their statement  that “in certain
emergency situation [sic], such as kidnappings, use of funds may be required before
identity of perpetrators has been established.”
Required Reports and Conditions.  In order to exercise this authority, the
Secretary of State must report to Committee on Appropriations that the newly elected
CRS-32
President of Colombia has committed, in writing, (1) to establish comprehensive
counter-drug measures, (2) to restore government authority and respect for human
rights in areas under effective control of paramilitary and guerrilla organization, (3)
to implement significant budgetary and personnel reforms of the Colombian Armed
Forces, and (4) to support substantial additional Colombian financial and other
resources to implement such policy and reforms, particularly to meet the country’s
previous commitments under Plan Colombia. (In its December 3, 2002, report to
Congress (see below), the State Department stated that it had provided a separate
report to Congress on “President Uribe’s determination to take a number of specific
actions, many of which are underway.”  This report does not appear to have been
posted on any website.)
The section on INC funding provides that the Secretary of  State also must
report that no U.S. Armed Forces personnel or U.S. civilian contractor employed by
the United States will participate in any combat operation in connection with
assistance made available for Colombia under that funding chapter.  The DOD
section places an ban on the use of such personnel in combat operations “except for
the purpose of acting in self defense or rescuing any U.S. citizen to include U.S.
armed forces personnel, U.S. civilian employees, and civilian contractors employed
by the United States.”  The INC authority will cease to be effective “if the Secretary
of State has credible evidence that the Colombian Armed Forces are not conducting
vigorous operations to restore government authority and respect for human rights in
areas under the effective control of paramilitary and guerrilla organizations.”
The statement of the managers notes that the bill does not require an Andean
Strategy Report required, but the Secretary of State  is directed to submit within 90
days a report to appropriations committees describing the President’s policy toward
Colombia, and benchmarks for meeting goals, and other policy details.   (This
strategy report was submitted on December 3, 2002, and is available at
[http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/02120302.htm].)
The managers stated that they expect that expanded authorities will continue
into 2003 unless Colombia fails to make a good faith effort to fulfill commitments
required by the bill, and intend for authorities to continue in any continuing
resolutions.   
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, FY2003
The House and Senate appropriations committees have each passed separate
versions of the FY2003 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill (H.R. 5410/S. 2779),
with ample restrictions on the use of funds for Colombia and other limitations on
funding for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI).  The House version fully funds
the President’s request for $731 million for the ACI; the Senate version funds it at
$637 million, i.e., $94 million less than the request.
House Action.  The House Appropriations Committee marked up and
reported H.R. 5410 on September 19, 2002 (H.Rept. 107-663). 
Committee Action.   The House Appropriations Committee fully funds the
President’s request for $731 million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, with
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funds to remain available until expended.  Using language authorizing expanded
activities in the emergency supplemental appropriations act (P.L. 107-206), the bill
provides that the funds available to the Department of State for assistance to the
Colombian government can be used  to support the “unified campaign” against drug
trafficking and against activities of designated terrorist groups, as well as emergency
actions to protect human health and welfare. The bill also contains the President’s
requested $98 million in Foreign Military Financing Funds (which may be transferred
to the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account), specifically
for “helicopters, training and other assistance for the Colombian Armed Forces for
security for the Cano Limon pipeline.”  The bill specifically prohibits any further
FMF funds in the bill from being used for helicopters “and related support services”
for Colombia. 
The committee bill contains several restrictions on the ACI funds.  Two
concern Colombia:
! The authority for funding to support Colombia’s unified campaign
“shall cease to be effective if the Secretary of State has credible
evidence that the Colombian Armed Forces are not conducting
vigorous operations to restore government authority and respect for
human rights in areas under the effective control of paramilitary and
guerrilla organizations...” 
! Any helicopter purchased with ACI funds from this act that is used
“to aid or abet the operations of any illegal self-defense group or
illegal security cooperative...shall be immediately returned to the
United States...”  
One concerns Peru:
! No funds from the act may be used to support a Peruvian air
interdiction program until the Secretary of State and Director of
Central Intelligence certify to the Congress that any such program
which permits the Peruvian Air Force to shoot down aircraft will
include enhanced safeguards and procedures in order to prevent
accidental shootdowns such as the one that occurred on April 20,
2001.  The certification must be made 30 days before the U.S.
resumes any involvement in a Peruvian air interdiction program.
Two are general restrictions:
! The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Administrator of
USAID, must provide the Appropriations committees with a detailed
report on the proposed uses of all ACI funds, broken down by
program, project, or activity for each country within 45 days of
enactment of the bill, and before obligating any funds. 
! Not more than $15.68 million of the ACI appropriation may be used
for administrative expenses of the Department of State, and not more
than $4.5 million for such expenses of USAID. 
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The bill caps the amount available from the ACI account for administrative expenses
of the Department of State at $14.24 million, and for U.S. AID at $4 million.         
In the Committee Report (H. Rpt. 107-663) accompanying the bill, the
Committee expressed a number of concerns.  Seven were related to Colombia:   
! Stating that “coca provides the revenue and motive behind the
violence committed by both the guerrilla and paramilitary groups,”
the Committee noted that it expected that counternarcotics,
alternative development, and judicial reform would remain “the
principal focus of United States policy in Colombia.” It stated that
its decision to make FY2003 funds available to support Colombia’s
unified campaign against narcotrafficking and terrorism, “is not a
signal from the Committee for the United States to become deeply
involved in assisting the Colombian Armed Forces in fighting the
terrorist groups, especially not at the expense of the counternarcotics
programs, but to provide the means for more effective intelligence
gathering and fusion, and to provide the flexibility to the Department
of State when the distinction between counternarcotics and
counterterrorism are not clear cut.”    The committee directed the
Secretary of State to report within 90 days of enactment on “the
changes in United States policy, including new procedures and
operations, as a result of implementing the expanded authorities.” 
! The Committee noted that eradication spraying of coca crops in
Putumayo was conducted for only three months during the past two
years, and expressed hope that, during the 17-month suspension of
spraying (February 2001 through July 2002),  development programs
had caught up with the needs of those whose crops had been
sprayed. The Committee stated its strong support for USAID’s
“ambitious new alternative development strategy” in Colombia,
which began in early 2002, focusing on the construction of
infrastructure and community development  rather than support for
alternative agricultural production.   
! The Committee noted that Afro-Colombians, whom it stated
represent “at least 25 percent” of Colombia’s population, “suffer
disproportionately from violence and displacement” due to violence.
It instructed USAID to provide “significant” additional funding for
programs that benefit Afro-Colombians, and  “to take the views and
specific problems of Afro-Colombians into account as it formulates
assistance projects in the areas of human rights, democracy,
displaced persons, and alternative development, including plans of
return.”  
! The Committee noted that the Colombian government had had
difficulty recruiting an adequate number of candidates to become
helicopter pilots.  It encouraged the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá “to
continue negotiating with the Colombian Navy and Colombian Air
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Force in efforts to identify possible candidates to alleviate the pilot
shortage...[and with] the new Colombian Minister of Defense to find
a way to combat inter-service and inter-agency rivalries that hinder
counternarcotics efforts.”    
! The Committee cited a 70 percent drop in coffee prices since 1997
as responsible for the destitution of 25 million coffee growers, many
of them in Central America and Colombia.  As a result, the
Committee urged USAID “to focus its rural development and relief
programs on regions severely affected by the coffee crisis, especially
in Colombia.” 
! The Committee noted that the Department of Justice had obligated
only half the funds made available to it for counternarcotics
programs in Colombia.  Preferring that  “instead of sitting idle, [the
remaining funds should] be used to help combat the humanitarian
crisis facing Colombia,” the Committee directed the State
Department to transfer the funds to USAID for development, rule of
law, and humanitarian assistance programs. 
! The Committee noted that it had only asked for one Colombia
certification during FY2003, rather than the two, semi-annual
communications required in FY2002, because it was “alarmed to
learn of the unintended costs to the pilot training program and the
helicopter maintenance program that the semiannual certifications
incurred at no apparent gain.”  
One was related to Bolivia:
! The Committee praised Bolivia for its progress in antidrug efforts.
It success, according to the Committee, came about “at a tremendous
sacrifice by the Bolivian people,” and  “in large part” because of
U.S. support.  Urging the Administration to “continue its strong
support of Bolivia’s efforts when deciding its allocation of aid,” the
Committee stated that progress “could be erased quickly if the
commitment by either the Bolivian government or the United States
were to falter.”  The Committee  noted its concern with delays in the
prosecutions of alleged human rights violations committed by
Bolivian security forces, and strongly encouraged Bolivia and the
Department of State to take all necessary actions under Section 553
of the Act  to address the situation.  (Section 553 is the “Leahy
amendment,” which prohibits funds appropriated by the act from
being provided to units of foreign security forces if there is credible
evidence that members of the unit  have committed gross violations
of human rights,  unless the country is bringing responsible members
to justice.)
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Two relate to the Andean region in general:
! The Committee notes that the Andean region (as well as the Central
American/Caribbean region) would benefit from trade capacity
building assistance, including that related to agricultural exports.  
! Noting that European cocaine consumption is rising, the Committee
urged the Secretary of State to negotiate with the United States’
European allies to contribute more funds to the Andean region’s
counternarcotics, alternative development, and judicial reform
efforts.
One concerned AID practices that relate to the Andean region: 
! In its explanation for the requirement that USAID submit a report on
the proposed uses of ACI funds before initial obligation, the
Committee noted its “disappointment in the level of pertinent
information included in the Department of State’s Congressional
Budget Justification and congressional notifications.” 
Senate Action.  The Senate Appropriations Committee marked up S. 2779 on
July 18, 2002; it was reported July 24 (S.Rept. 107-219). On January 15, 2003,
Senator Stevens introduced an omnibus  FY2003 appropriations bill as S.Amdt. 1 to
H.J.Res. 2 (for continuing appropriations).  The bill includes a slightly modified
version of S. 2779, which provides only $80 million less in ACI funding than the
President’s request.
Committee Action.  The Senate Appropriations Committee bill (S. 2779)
would fund the Andean Counterdrug Initiative at $637 million, $94 million less than
the President’s request.  There was no mention in the bill or accompanying report as
to how that was to be apportioned among the recipient countries.  The bill provides
up to $88 million of the requested $98 million for the Cano-Limon pipeline
protection program, of which $71 million is to be used to purchase helicopters.  It is
not clear how much of the remainder of the total ARI request ($979.8 million, or
$150.8 million over the ACI and the Cano-Limon pipeline requests) is funded.  The
ACI account may be augmented by an additional $35 million from new and prior year
monies in the INC account.  
The bill specifies that not less than $215 million of the ACI account is to be
apportioned directly to U.S. AID for social and economic programs.  It also earmarks
(1)  $5 million for training and equipping a Colombian Armed Forces unit dedicated
to apprehending the leaders of paramilitary organizations, (2) $3.5 million for
assistance to the Colombian National Park Service for training, equipment, and other
assistance to protect Colombia’s national parks and reserves, which according to the
report are threatened by illegal drug cultivation and illegal logging, and (3) $2 million
for vehicles, equipment, and other assistance for the human rights unit of the
Procurador General.
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The bill retains the caps of 400 on the number of U.S. civilian contractors and
on the number of U.S. military personnel that can be funded during FY2003.  It also
places several conditions on the use of funds in the bill. 
(1) It requires the Secretary of State to certify that certain human rights criteria
are being met before 60% of the funds appropriated by this act or prior foreign
operations appropriations act to assist the Colombian Armed Forces and National
police can be expended, not withstanding any other provision of law.  These criteria
are:  (a) that the Colombian Commander General is suspending soldiers and officers
credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights or to have aided
or abetted paramilitary groups; (b) that the Colombian government is prosecuting and
punishing those members of the Colombian armed forces who have been credibly
alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights, or to have aided or
abetted paramilitary organizations, and that the Colombian armed forces are
cooperating with civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities in prosecuting and
punishing in civilian courts any members credibly alleged to be involved in such
offenses; (c) that the Colombian armed forces are severing links with paramilitary
groups at the command, battalion, and brigade levels; and (d) that the Colombian
armed forces are apprehending the leaders of paramilitary organizations.
The remaining 40% of the funds can be obligated after June 1, 2003, if the
Secretary of State again determines and certifies that the Colombian armed forces
continue to meet the above criteria, and if they are conducting “vigorous” operations
to restore government authority and respect for human rights in areas under the
effective control of paramilitary and guerrilla organizations.
In making these certifications, the Secretary of State is required to meet at least
10 days prior to making the certification with internationally recognized human rights
organizations regarding progress in meeting these criteria.  The Secretary is also
required to submit a report to Congress 120 days after enactment and every 120 days
after that describing the actions taken by the Colombia armed forces to meet these
criteria. 
(2)  It requires that the Secretary of State submit a report on the usage and safety
of chemicals used in the aerial coca fumigation program in Colombia (as discussed
in the section at the beginning of this report on the hold on certain FY2002 funding)
before FY2003 funds can be used to purchase those chemicals.  
(3) It bans the participation of U.S. military personnel or U.S. civilian
contractors in combat operations.  It requires the return of any helicopter procured
with funding from this bill if that helicopter should be used to aid or abet the
operations of any illegal self-defense groups or illegal security cooperatives. 
(4) It prohibits the use of funds from the bill to support a Peruvian air
interdiction program unless the Secretary of State and Director of Central Intelligence
certify to Congress, 30 days before the resumption of U.S. involvement in such a
program, that effective safeguards and procedures are in place to prevent a shoot
down similar to that of April 20, 2001, in Peru.  
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Floor Action.  On January 15, 2003, Senator Stevens introduced an omnibus
FY2003 appropriations bill (containing versions of the 11 unpassed FY2003
spending measures) as S.Amdt. 1 to H.J.Res. 2 (for continuing appropriations).  The
bill includes a slightly modified version of the ARI/Colombia related provisions of
S. 2779.  In particular, the bill provides $650 million for ACI funding, specifically
for counternarcotics purposes (compared to $637 million in S. 2779).  The bill
includes all the ACI earmarks in S. 2779), but increases the ACI funding earmarked
for USAID to $225 million ($10 million over S. 2779) and adds an earmark for $3
million for web monitoring software and related training for the Colombian National
Police.  It retains the cap of $4.5 million of ACI funding for administrative expenses
of USAID, but increases the cap for such State Department expenses by $560,000 to
$14.8 million.  Like S. 2779, S.Amdt. 1 provides $88 million in FMF for oil pipeline
protection, which can be transferred to the ACI account.
Most of the ACI-related conditions and certification requirements in S. 2779 are
retained in S.Amdt. 1, albeit with some modifications.  
! The caps of 400 on military personnel and 400 on U.S. civilian
contractors who can be present in Colombia at one time are retained.
The bill also continues to waive the Section 482(b) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended) restriction on the use of ACI
funds for weapons and ammunition. 
! The human rights certification requirement is retained, with the same
criteria as S. 2779, but only on 25% of the ACI funds.  An initial
75% of the ACI funds can be obligated and spent without being
certified.  Of the remaining 25%, one-half (or 12.5%) can be
obligated as soon as the Secretary of State certifies that the specified
human rights criteria are being met, and the remainder can be spent
after that certification, but not prior to July 1, 2003.  Unlike S. 2779,
no follow-up human rights reports are required. 
! The environmental certification requirement for the continued use
of funds for the aerial fumigation spraying program is retained,
although with modifications and additions to the S. 2779 criteria that
enlarge the role of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
S.Amdt. 1 requires that the Secretary of State and the EPA
Administrator each certify four criteria.  (S. 2779 requires only a
certification from the Secretary of State, after consultation with the
EPA Administrator.)  There is one new criterion: that an
environmental impact statement (EIS) “has been completed in a
manner consistent with that required for comparable use of the
herbicide mixture in the United States.”  Another criterion appears
to be a modification of two S. 2779 criteria:  that the “herbicide
mixture is being used in accordance with the EIS, EPA label
requirements for comparable use in the United States and any
additional controls recommended by the EPA for this program, and
with Colombian laws including the Environmental Management
Plan for aerial fumigation.” Two criteria are virtually identical to
those of S. 2779, i.e., one regarding the health and safety effects of
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the fumigation spray, and one to evaluate complaints of ill effects of
the spraying.   
! The amendment drops the prohibition regarding the air interdiction
program in Peru.
! The amendment retains the ban on the participation of U.S. military
personnel or U.S. civilian contractors in combat operations, and the
requirement that for the return of any helicopter procured with
funding from the bill if it is  used to aid or abet operations of illegal
self-defense groups or illegal security cooperatives. 
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FY2002-FY2003
The conference report on H.R. 1646 was approved by the House by voice vote
on September 25, 2002, and was approved by the Senate by unanimous consent on
September 26, 2002.  It was signed into law (P.L. 107-228) on September 30, 2002.
House Action.  The House International Relations Committee reported out
H.R. 1646 on May 4, 2001, with four reporting requirements on Colombia and a
prohibition on the issuance of visas to supporters of illegal armed groups in
Colombia.  The bill was  passed by the House on May 16, 2001, without additions
or modifications in that area.  The required reports relate to the elimination of
Colombian opium, the effects of Plan Colombia on Ecuador, alternative development
and resettlement programs, and the Colombianization of counternarcotics activities.
Committee Action.  H.R. 1646 was introduced by Representative Hyde on
April 27, 2001, with two reporting requirements concerning the elimination of
Colombian opium poppy crops and the effect of Plan Colombia on Ecuador (see
below for details).  The measure was referred to the House Committee on
International Relations.  When the Committee marked up the bill on May 2, 2001,
it adopted by voice vote two amendments offered by Representative Delahunt: the
first required a report on Department of State activities relating to various reform
efforts in Colombia, and on the transfer of counter-narcotics activities by contracted
U.S. businesses to Colombian nationals; and the second prohibited the issuance of
visas to supporters of Colombian illegal armed groups (see below for details).  The
bill was reported out amended (H.Rept. 107-57) by the Committee on May 4, 2001.
Floor Action.  After floor consideration on May 10 and 16, 2001, with no
additional amendments on Colombia or the Andean region, H.R. 1646 was approved
by the House on May 16, and sent to the Senate on May 17, 2001, with reporting
requirements on Colombia and a prohibition on the issuance of visas to illegal armed
groups in Colombia.  The required reports related to the elimination of Colombian
opium, the effects of Plan Colombia on Ecuador, Department of State funded reform
activities, and the transfer of counter-narcotics activities by contracted U.S.
businesses to Colombian nationals, especially Colombian antinarcotics police.  (See
enacted legislation summarized below for details)
Senate Action.  The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the
Senate version of the Foreign Relations Authorization for FY2002-FY2003 (S. 1401)
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on August 1, 2001, and reported out the bill on September 4, 2001, with a
requirement for a report outlining a strategy to eradicate opium in Colombia.  On
May 1, 2002, the Senate approved H.R. 1646 after incorporating the text of a Senate
measure on security assistance (S. 1803) approved in December 2001.
Committee Action.  The Committee on Foreign Relations reported out S.
1401 on September 4, 2001, with a provision in section 606, similar to a provision
in the House version of the bill, requiring the Secretary of State to submit to
appropriate congressional committees within 60 days after enactment a report that
outlines a comprehensive strategy to eradicate all opium at its source in Colombia.
Conference Action and Enactment.  The conference report on H.R.
1646 (H.Rept. 107-671) filed on September 23, 2002, contained two sections on
Colombia, with requirements for reports that are similar to the requirements in the
House-passed version of the bill.  However, the coverage in the required reports in
Section 694 of the legislation is broadened to include the activities of the Department
of Defense, and the subsequent reports are to be made yearly rather than semi-
annually.  The prohibition on the issuance of visas to illegal armed groups in
Colombia was dropped on grounds that it was duplicative of existing authorities,
particularly authorities in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).  The
conference report on H.R. 1646 was approved by the House by voice vote on
September 25, 2002, and was approved by the Senate by unanimous consent on
September 26, 2002.  It was signed into law (P.L. 107-228) on September 30, 2002,
with the following relevant requirements.
Report on State and Defense Departments’ Reform Activities.
Section 694 (a) of the legislation requires the Secretary of State to submit within 180
days of enactment, and not later than April 1 of each year thereafter, a report on State
and Defense Department funded and authorized activities to promote alternative
development, recovery and resettlement of internally displaced persons, judicial
reform, the peace process, and human rights.  This report is to include summaries of
activities undertaken during the previous 12-month period, estimated timetables for
the next 12-month period, an explanation of any delays in meeting planned
timetables, and an assessment of steps to be taken to correct such delays.
Report on “Colombianization” Efforts.  Section 694(b) states that it is the
policy of the United States to encourage the transfer of counternarcotics activities in
Colombia now carried out by contracted U.S. businesses to Colombian nationals, “in
particular personnel of the Colombian antinarcotics police, when properly qualified
personnel are available.”  It requires the Secretary of State to report, within 180 days
of enactment, and not later than April 1 of each year thereafter, on the
counternarcotics activities carried out by U.S. businesses under State or Defense
Department contracts.  The report must include the names of such businesses, the
total State or Defense Department payments to each business, a statement justifying
each agreement, an assessment of risks to personnel safety and potential involvement
in hostilities incurred by employees of each such business, and a plan to provide for
the transfer of these activities to Colombians, in particular to qualified personnel of
the Colombian antinarcotics police.
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Reports on Eradication of Colombian Opium and on Impact of Plan
Colombia on Ecuador and Colombia’s Neighbors.  Section 695 requires the
Secretary of State to submit within 150 days of enactment a report which sets forth
a comprehensive strategy for United States activities in Colombia related to (1) the
eradication of opium cultivation at its source in Colombia, and (2) the impact of Plan
Colombia on Ecuador and the other adjacent countries to Colombia.  
National Defense Authorization Act, FY2003
The House-passed cap of 500 on the number of DOD-funded U.S. military
personnel involved in operations in Colombia was dropped by conferees on the
FY2003 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4546/P.L. 107-314).  
House Action.  As passed by the House on May 10, 2002, H.R. 4546, the
National Defense Authorization bill for FY2003, includes a provision that would
establish a cap of 500 on the number of U.S. military personnel in Colombia who are
supported or maintained by Department of Defense funds. However, the Secretary
of Defense may waive the cap for national security reasons. 
Committee Action.  On May 1, 2002, the House Armed Services Committee
reported out H.R. 4546, the National Defense Authorization bill for FY2003.  Section
1206 of the bill, added by amendment during markup, would set a cap of 500 on the
number of DOD-funded U.S. military personnel involved in operations in Colombia
at any one time.  The Secretary of Defense would be allowed to waive the cap for
national security reasons.  The Secretary would have to report his decision to waive
the cap to the armed services committees within 15 days.  The amendment offered
by Representative Gene Taylor to set the cap at 500 was amended by the addition of
the waiver provision by Representative Saxby Chambliss.  It then passed 32-26.  The
cap specifically excludes personnel serving diplomatic functions or performing
emergency missions.
There is currently a cap of 400 on the number of U.S. military personnel who
can operate in Colombia in support of President Pastrana’s “Plan Colombia.” This
cap was established through the section on Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI)
funding in the FY2002 foreign operations appropriations act (P.L. 107-115), which
amended the original Section  3204(b)(1)(A) cap of 500 set in the “Plan Colombia”
FY2000 supplemental appropriations (P.L. 106-246).  The cap specifically excludes
personnel serving diplomatic functions or performing emergency missions. 
U.S. support for Pastrana’s “Plan Colombia,” provided through  P.L. 106-246
and the FY2001 and FY2002 foreign operations acts, includes U.S. military support
for the training of Colombian Army Counternarcotics battalions and counternarcotics
interdiction funded by the State Department.  [As long as the Department of Defense
continues to pay the salaries of participating U.S. military personnel, these personnel
presumably would be considered to be supported or maintained by DOD funding.]
The U.S. military currently also conducts a variety of counternarcotics operations in
Colombia under Department of Defense authorities and funding.
 
Floor Action.  The House passed H.R. 4546 on May 10, 2002, with the
Committee-reported cap and waiver on U.S. military personnel in Colombia.
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Senate Action.  As passed by the Senate on June 27, 2002, H.R. 4546, as
amended by the incorporation of S. 2514 in lieu of the House version, does not
contain a cap on U.S. military personnel in Colombia. 
Conference Action.  The House receded on its cap provision.  The
conference report (H.Rept. 107-772) was passed by the House on November 12 and
the Senate on November 13, and it was signed into law (P.L. 107-314) on December
2, 2002.
Intelligence Authorization Act, FY2003
Section 501 of the FY2003 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 107-306, signed
into law November 27, 2002) authorizes the use of funds designated for intelligence
and for intelligence-related purposes for FY2002 and FY2003, and any unobligated
funds available to the intelligence committee for prior fiscal years to support
Colombia’s unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and specified terrorist
organizations, and for specified emergency situations.  It contains a one-time
certification requirement for such use and restrictions on the use of funds, and
provides for the termination of such authority on specified human rights grounds, as
detailed below under Floor Action. 
House Action.   During consideration of H.R. 4628, the House adopted a
Pelosi amendment by voice vote on July 25, 2002, which would provide authority for
counter-drug and counterterrorism activities in Colombia, but restrict the uses of
funds for those activities.  The bill passed the House by voice vote on the same day.
Committee Action.  On July 18, 2002, the House Select Committee on
Intelligence reported H.R. 4628 (H.Rept. 107-592), the FY2003 intelligence
authorization bill, which would provide authority for the use of intelligence and
intelligence-related funds for counternarcotics and counterterrorism activities,
“notwithstanding any other provision of law.”  The statement of authority reads:
“Funds designated for intelligence or intelligence-related purposes for assistance to
the Government of Colombia for counter-drug activities for fiscal years 2002 and
2003, and any unobligated funds available to any element of the intelligence
community for such activities for a prior fiscal year, shall be available to support a
unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and against activities” by the FARC,
ELN, and AUC, “and to take actions to protect human health and welfare in
emergency circumstances, including undertaking rescue operations.”
Floor Action.   On July 25, the House adopted the Pelosi amendment (Section
501), which would place much the same restrictions on aid to Colombia as contained
in the FY2002 supplemental appropriations act, H.R. 4775. 
Section 501 placed the same certification requirement concerning written
promises by the President of Colombia  and the same human rights conditions, visa
restrictions, and personnel caps as H.R. 4775, with the certification to be made by the
Secretary of Defense.  Section 501 also contains a provision to terminate authority
if the Secretary of Defense “has credible evidence that the Colombian Armed Forces
are not conducting vigorous operations to restore government authority and respect
for human rights in areas under the effective control of paramilitary and guerrilla
CRS-43
39 For details on this legislation, see CRS Report RL30790, The Andean Trade Preference
Act: Background and Issues for Reauthorization, by J. F. Hornbeck.  More detailed and
updated information can be found on the CRS Web site in the CRS Electronic Briefing Book
on Trade at  [http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebtra1.shtml].  
organizations.”  In addition, it provides that no U.S. armed forces personnel or U.S.
civilian contractor employed by the United State can participate in combat operations
in connection with funds made available  under Section 501, except to act in self-
defense or to rescue U.S. citizens. 
Conference Action.    Conferees incorporated House language on Colombia
in Section 501 of the conference version of H.R. 4628 (H.Rept. 107-789).  On
November 15, 2002, the House and Senate passed the conference bill, and it was
signed into law (P.L. 107-306) on November 27, 2002.
Extension of Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA)39
House Action.  On October 5, 2001, the House Ways and Means Committee
ordered reported H.R. 3009, the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act,
that would extend the ATPA through December 31, 2006.  On November 16, 2001,
the House passed H.R. 3009, the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act,
which would offer expanded trade benefits to the Andean region through December
31, 2006. 
Committee Action.  On October 5, 2001, the House Ways and Means
Committee approved and ordered reported H.R. 3009, the Andean Trade Promotion
and Drug Eradication Act, that would extend the ATPA through December 31, 2006,
and provide duty-free treatment to selected apparel, tuna, and other products
previously excluded. The bill would also expand the conditions countries would have
to meet to remain eligible for program benefits.
Floor Action.  On November 16, 2001, the House passed H.R. 3009, the
Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, which would offer expanded
trade benefits to the Andean region through December 31, 2006.
Senate Action.  The Senate Committee on Finance reported out a version of
H.R. 3009 on November 29, 2001, and the Senate passed the ATPA extension on
May 23, 2002, as part of an omnibus trade bill including trade promotion authority
and trade adjustment assistance. 
Committee Action.  On November 29, 2001, the Senate Committee on
Finance reported out an amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 3009
(containing the substance of S. 525).  This version would extend the ATPA through
February 28, 2006, and provide expanded benefits, but more limited benefits than the
House-passed version.  On May 1, 2002, the Committee substitute was withdrawn
and a broader trade package was subsequently adopted as a substitute amendment.
Floor Action.  Following extended negotiations between the White House and
Republican and Democratic leaders in the Senate, on May 23, 2002, the Senate
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approved Senate Amendment 3401 to H.R. 3009, a broader trade package including
ATPA extension, trade promotion (“fast track”) authority for the President, and trade
adjustment assistance for workers displaced by trade agreements.  The same day,  the
Senate approved H.R. 3009, as amended, by a 66-30 vote.
Conference Action and Enactment.  On July 26, 2002, conferees reported
the conference version of H.R. 3009 (H.Rept. 107-624).  The conference report was
approved by the House on July 27 and by the Senate on August 1.  It was signed into
law (P.L. 107-210) on August 6, 2002.  Title XXXI of the Act, entitled  the Andean
Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act, extends preferential tariff treatment
through December 31, 2006, and broadens coverage to include products previously
excluded.
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Appendix A.  Map Showing Andean Regional
Initiative Countries
CRS-46
Appendix B.  FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative
Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) FY2002 Request












ARI FY2002 Allocations 

























Colombia 399.00 380.50 137.00 243.50 380.50 0 0 0 0
Bolivia 143.48 122.46 74.46 48.00 81.00 12.05 19.41 10.00 0.5*
Brazil 26.18 18.63 12.63 6.00 6.00 3.93 8.70 0 0
Ecuador 76.48 46.86 31.85 15.00 25.00 6.86 0 15.00 0
Panama 20.50 13.50 8.50 5.00 5.00 4.50 0 4.00 0
Peru 206.15 194.87 119.87 75.00 142.50 14.17 23.20 15.00 0
Venezuela 10.50 5.5 0.50 5.00 5.00 0 0 0.50 0
Totals 882.29 782.32 348.82 379.50 645.00 41.51 51.31 44.5 0.50
Source:  Office of the Secretary of State.  International Affairs Function 150 Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Request Summary and Highlights.  February 2002.  The
ARI does not include International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds.  These will range in FY2002 from an estimated $170,000 for Panama to
an estimated $1,180,000 for Colombia.  Prepared by Nina M. Serafino, February 12, 2002.
* The ARI for FY2002 also did not include Foreign Military Finance Funding (FMF).  The small amount for Bolivia is included here, even though it was not
specifically for counternarcotics purposes, in order to facilitate comparisons with the FY2003 request, which includes FMF for Andean Regional Initiative
countries.
Note:  Totals may not add due to rounding.
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Appendix C.  FY2003 Andean Regional Initiative
Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) FY2003 Request 




























Colombia 537.0 164.0 373.0 439.0 0 0 98.0
Bolivia 132.6 82.6 50.0 91.0 30.6 10.0 1.0
Brazil 29.5 17.5 12.0 12.0 17.5 0 0
Ecuador 65.1 43.1 22.0 37.0 7.1 20.0 1.0
Panama 20.5 10.5 10.0 9.0 7.0 3.5 1.0
Peru 186.6 119.6 67.0 135.0 40.6 10.0 1.0
Venezuela 8.5 0.5 8.0 8.0 0 0.5 0
Totals 979.8 437.8 542.0 731.0 102.8 44.0 102.0
Source:  Office of the Secretary of State, Resources, Plans and Policy.  International Affairs Function 150 Summary and
Highlights, Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Request.  The ARI totals do not include International Military Education and
Training funds, which range in the FY2003 request from $200,000 for Panama to $1,180,000 for Colombia.  Prepared
by Nina M. Serafino, Specialist in International Security Affairs, February 12, 2002.
* Includes funds previously cited under Child Survival and Diseases.
